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Regulation of Emerging Risks 
Matthew T. Wansley* 
Why has the EPA not regulated fracking? Why has the FDA not 
regulated e-cigarettes? Why has NHTSA not regulated autonomous vehicles? 
This Article argues that administrative agencies predictably fail to regulate 
emerging risks when the political environment for regulation is favorable. The 
cause is a combination of administrative law and interest group politics. 
Agencies must satisfy high initial informational thresholds to regulate, so they 
postpone rulemaking in the face of uncertainty about the effects of new 
technologies. But while regulators passively acquire more information, 
fledgling industries consolidate and become politically entrenched. By the time 
agencies can justify regulation, the newly entrenched industries have the 
political capital to thwart them. 
This Article offers a prophylactic against this predictable regulatory 
failure. It defends an experimentalist model of regulation, in which agencies are 
empowered to impose moratoria on risky emerging technologies while 
regulators organize experiments to learn about the risks they pose and the 
means to mitigate them. The agency-coordinated experiments would expedite 
the promulgation of empirically informed rules. The moratoria would extend 
the political window for regulatory action and protect the public in the interim. 
The Article applies this experimentalist model to the regulation of fracking, e-
cigarettes, and autonomous vehicles. It also identifies legal strategies for 
implementing experimental regulation under existing law. It challenges the 
conventional wisdom that agencies should postpone regulation until they can 
confidently predict the effects of new risky technologies. 
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Emerging risks differ from other risks that the state regulates 
in two ways. The first is epistemic: the information necessary to answer 
potentially dispositive questions about how the risk should be regulated 
will not be available when regulators first become aware of the 
technology. For example, regulators do not currently know whether 
fracking contaminates groundwater, whether e-cigarettes help smokers 
quit, or what effects autonomous vehicles will have on the rate of 
collisions.1 But effective regulation of each of these risks requires 
answers to these basic questions. 
The second is political: emerging risks create a brief window 
during which a wide range of regulatory interventions are politically 
viable. But that window can quickly elapse as interest groups and social 
norms become entrenched. Before fracking became intertwined in our 
economy and e-cigarettes became widely used, there was no powerful, 
organized interest group coalition opposing regulation. Now, even if 
evidence accumulates that suggests restrictions are justified, restrictive 
regulation may no longer be possible. The window for a safe transition 
to autonomous vehicles may also close suddenly if a high-profile 
collision turns public opinion against the technology. 
There is a mismatch between existing administrative law and 
these features of emerging risks. The conventional rulemaking process 
requires agencies to satisfy high, early informational hurdles that they 
would struggle to meet when regulating emerging risks. A regulatory 
agency must generally give notice of a proposed rule, provide an 
opportunity for comments on the proposed rule, and respond to those 
comments.2 It must also conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the rule.3 
After an agency promulgates the rule, the rule will be subject to judicial 
 
 1.  For a review of the evidence on each of these issues, see infra Part IV. 
 2.  See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012) (“[N]otice of proposed rule making shall be published in 
the Federal Register . . . After notice . . . the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity 
to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or 
without opportunity for oral presentation.”). 
 3.  Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012) (“[E]ach agency must . . . propose or 
adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs . . . .”). 
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review, and the agency will be expected to justify its substantive 
decisions during the rulemaking process.4 
Each of these hurdles can be insurmountable obstacles to 
regulating emerging risks. An agency may lack sufficient information 
to respond to skeptical comments from regulated parties. It could offer 
only speculative predictions about a rule’s costs and benefits. It would 
create a rulemaking record vulnerable to judicial challenge. 
Consequently, agencies often postpone regulating emerging risks. But 
while agencies wait to acquire more information, interest groups 
organize and social norms crystallize. When agencies are prepared to 
regulate, the political window for optimal regulation may have elapsed. 
This Article proposes that regulatory agencies should be granted 
a new set of powers to regulate emerging risks. Specifically, agencies 
should be empowered to (1) organize experiments with new risky 
technologies; and (2) impose moratoria or other limits on the use of 
those technologies outside of the experimental conditions. Agencies 
would be able to initiate these powers without having to satisfy the 
procedural requirements of the conventional rulemaking process, and 
some of their decisions would be protected from judicial review. But the 
powers would be temporary and limited in scope. Once the experiments 
conclude, agencies would need to proceed to rulemaking or end the 
moratoria. 
The new powers would enable early, effective regulation of 
emerging risks. The experiment power would allow agencies to rapidly 
acquire reliable information about the risk and how to regulate it. The 
moratorium power would protect against interference with 
experimental conditions and prevent the political window for regulatory 
action from elapsing while the experiments were ongoing. The time and 
scope limits would protect against agencies using these powers as a de 
facto regulatory tool. 
This Article defends the utility of these specific legal reforms. 
But they are intended to illuminate a new way of thinking about how 
public policy should respond to emerging risks. The Article contrasts 
this new model with the three main alternative models for regulating 
emerging risks: (1) the Precautionary model5—banning new risky 
 
 4.  See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012) (providing that courts shall “hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” or “unsupported by substantial evidence”). 
 5.  See generally, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE 
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM 
NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010). 
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technologies until they are proven safe; (2) the Common Law model6—
allowing market innovation until regulation is proven cost-benefit 
justified; and (3) the Laboratory of Democracy model7—relying on state 
and local governments to test out regulatory solutions and choosing the 
best.8 
Each of these models has its disadvantages. The Precautionary 
model does not provide a determinate answer when a new technology 
both creates new risks and mitigates existing risks, unless the state 
simply bans all potentially risky technologies regardless of their 
benefits and forgoes socially useful innovation. The Common Law 
model allows for market innovation, but also permits interest groups to 
entrench themselves and impede even cost-benefit justified regulation. 
The Laboratory of Democracy model can start a race to the bottom, in 
which the regulatory regime that most favors firms’ interests wins out. 
Critically, none of these models provide a mechanism for what 
the regulation of emerging risks needs most: rigorously controlled 
experiments that produce useful knowledge about which regulatory 
response is best. This Article defends an Experimentalist model for 
regulating emerging risks, building on recent scholarship arguing for a 
greater use of randomized experiments in regulation.9 The 
Experimentalist model aims to maximize the potential for regulatory 
learning, while preserving regulatory options. 
This new model should not apply to all areas of risk regulation. 
For many risks, from asbestos to climate change, the relevant science 
is settled, so there is little marginal value to publicly organized 
experiments. For other risks, especially catastrophic risks, randomized 
experiments might not be feasible or ethical. Some risks are latent for 
decades, so controlled experiments would take too long for any 
concurrent moratoria to be meaningfully temporary. Likewise, when 
science learns of a new risk from old technologies—for example, when 
we learn that plastics are leaching endocrine disruptors10—imposing a 
 
 6.  See generally, e.g., Henry N. Butler, A Defense of Common Law Environmentalism: The 
Discovery of Better Environmental Policy, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 705 (2008); Roger Meiners & 
Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 923 (1999). 
 7.  See generally, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). 
 8.  See infra Part II. 
 9.  See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 929, 931–33 (2011); Zachary J. Gubler, Experimental Rules, 55 B.C. L. REV. 129, 129–30 
(2014). 
 10.  See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ENV’T. PROGRAMME & WORLD HEALTH ORG., STATE OF THE 
SCIENCE OF ENDOCRINE DISRUPTING CHEMICALS – 2012, iii (Åke Bergman et. al. eds., 2013), 
        
406 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:2:401 
moratorium would be difficult because the relevant interest groups 
might have already mobilized. Most importantly, although experiments 
would help resolve questions of fact, they provide no help with questions 
of value that regulators inevitably confront. Few experts dispute that 
obesity has become a significant public health problem.11 But the 
regulatory choices—and the questions of moral and political philosophy 
that underlie them—remain labyrinthine. 
Experiments and moratoria can be useful for a heterogeneous 
set of sources of emerging risks: consumer products, industrial 
processes, and the byproducts of research in science and engineering. 
To this Article’s list of fracking, e-cigarettes, and autonomous vehicles, 
one might add genetically modified organisms,12 nanotechnology,13 or 
other emerging risks. But the most important risks to regulate may be 
those that have yet to emerge. So while the Article proposes solutions 
to three current issues in risk regulation, the point of the examples is 
to give some empirical plausibility to the claim that agencies ought to 
have the experiment and moratorium powers available to address 
emerging risks in the future. 
Fully institutionalizing an Experimentalist model of regulation 
would require a new statute authorizing the experiment and 
moratorium powers. That one statute could be leveraged to solve a 
broad set of recurring problems in health, safety, and environmental 
regulation. As long as a new, risky technology fits within the 
substantive areas of risk that an agency was statutorily authorized to 
regulate, the experiment and moratorium powers could be used to 
regulate the risk. But because the prospect of adopting any new 
regulatory statute in the current political environment is minimal,14 the 
Article concludes with second-best strategies for partially 




 11.  E.g., Barbara L. Atwell, Obesity, Public Health, and the Food Supply, 4 IND. HEALTH L. 
REV. 3, 3 (2007) (“It is undisputed that obesity is one of the major public health concerns of our 
day.”). 
 12.  See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically 
Modified Foods, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 403–06 (2002) (advocating a more precautionary 
approach for regulation of genetically modified foods). 
 13.  See, e.g., Gregory Mandel, Nanotechnology Governance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1323, 1325–26 
(2008) (discussing nanotechnology and its current regulation, and suggesting improvements in its 
regulatory scheme). 
 14.  See, e.g., Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2014) (observing that “Congress has not passed a major environmental statute in nearly 
a quarter-century, nor has it produced more than incremental reforms to federal energy legislation 
during that time, despite dramatic technological, economic, and social changes in these fields that 
would seem to demand a legislative response.”). 
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The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the mismatch 
between existing administrative law and the features of emerging risks. 
Part II critiques the alternative models that scholars have proposed for 
regulating emerging risks. Part III presents the Experimentalist model 
and defends granting agencies experiment and moratorium powers. 
Part IV applies that model to the regulation of fracking, e-cigarettes, 
and autonomous vehicles. Part V proposes second-best strategies for 
partially implementing experiment and moratorium powers under 
existing law. 
I. MISMATCH BETWEEN EXISTING LAW AND EMERGING RISKS 
Administrative law conditions an agency’s rulemaking power on 
the agency satisfying a series of informational hurdles. The most 
important of these are (1) notice and comment rulemaking; (2) cost-
benefit analysis; and (3) judicial review. Scholars have long contested 
the utility of these hurdles for most rules.15 I take no position on these 
larger debates; I address only the desirability of these information 
hurdles for rules designed to regulate emerging risks. 
I defend three claims about existing law and its effects on 
emerging risks. First, for many emerging risks, there will be a gap 
between the information an agency will have about the risk and its 
possible means of mitigation, and the information the agency needs to 
satisfy these information hurdles. Second, as a result of this gap, 
agencies will often postpone regulation of emerging risks as they wait 
to acquire more information. Third, while agencies wait, the political 
environment for regulation may change, and the rule that an agency 
later determines to be justified may no longer be politically viable. 
I cannot prove any of these claims in the abstract. The only way 
to offer evidence for these claims is with specific examples. Part IV 
demonstrates each of these claims—the gap between the information 
the agency has and the information it would need to regulate, the 
postponement of regulation, and the change in political economy during 
that postponement—for both fracking and e-cigarettes. It also offers 
suggestive evidence that these claims might be true for autonomous 
vehicles as well. My hope is that these empirical examples will convince 
the reader that the more general claims are likely to be true. 
This Part analyzes in more detail the informational hurdles that 
existing law requires and the mismatch they create for emerging risks. 
It then explains why the political economy for regulation might change 
as an agency waits to acquire information to meet those hurdles. 
 
 15.  See infra notes 19–22, 24, 26–34, 36–42 and accompanying text. 
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A. Existing Law 
The law governing administrative rulemaking comes from four 
sources: the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),16 organic statutes, 
judicial doctrines, and executive orders. These sources of law have 
largely congealed into a standardized procedure for agency rulemaking. 
First, an agency provides notice of a proposed rule and facilitates public 
comment on the rule. Second, the agency conducts an analysis of a rule’s 
costs and benefits. Third, the final rule is subject to judicial review. 
1. Notice and Comment Rulemaking 
Under the APA, rulemaking starts when an agency publishes a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register, which must 
include “either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a 
description of the subjects and issues involved.”17 The agency must then 
provide “interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule 
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments,” and, 
after considering those public comments, the agency must “incorporate 
in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and 
purpose.”18 The agency must also keep a public record of the rulemaking 
process, which includes “copies or an index of written factual material, 
studies, and reports relied on or seriously consulted by agency 
personnel in formulating the proposed” rule.19 
Although these procedural requirements may sound modest, in 
practice they place substantial informational demands on agencies. 
Through judicial interpretation, “the APA requirement that agencies 
must attach a ‘concise general statement of basis and purpose’ to final 
rules . . . has blossomed into a requirement that agencies provide a 
‘reasoned explanation’ for rules and that they rationally respond to 
outside comments passing a ‘threshold requirement of materiality.’ “20 
Therefore, agencies must offer reasons for their own decisions in 
 
 16.  5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2012). 
 17.  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2012). 
 18.  5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 19.  Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, American Bar Association, 
Special Feature, A Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 34 
(2002). But see id. at 35 (“The obligation to disclose written factual material, studies, and reports 
relied on or seriously consulted by agency personnel is limited to materials whose disclosure would 
be required under the Freedom of Information Act.”). 
 20.  Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 1385, 1400 (1992) (quoting Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973)). 
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rulemaking and reasons in response to comments from private parties 
that will satisfy reviewing courts. 
Firms that seek to avoid regulation can strategically use the 
informational demands of notice and comment rulemaking to delay or 
prevent new rules. For example, they can deliberately flood the agency 
with comments, knowing that the agency will be held accountable for 
responding to them during judicial review.21 Agencies are therefore 
faced with the choice of expending precious resources to respond in 
detail, ignoring the comments and risking judicial invalidation of the 
rule, or forgoing regulation altogether. Because agencies often elect to 
forgo regulation, some scholars have argued that the rulemaking 
process has ossified.22 
Regardless of whether the rulemaking process has become too 
demanding in general, the notice and comment requirements are 
crippling when agencies seek to regulate emerging risks. In this 
context, agencies often lack the facts to offer a reasoned justification for 
their rules, and they are often unable to rebut regulated parties’ 
comments raising doubts about the proposed rule in light of factual 
uncertainties. Consequently, agencies face strong pressure to forgo 
regulation of emerging risks. 
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
A series of executive orders, uninterrupted since the Reagan 
administration, require agencies to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of 
certain proposed rules.23 Some regulatory statutes impose a cost-benefit 
 
 21.  See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1329–34 (2010) (explaining how a commitment to open government in the 
administrative system allows regulated firms to use the informational requirements of the 
rulemaking process strategically). 
 22.  See McGarity, supra note 20, at 1426 (“As long as . . . agency decisionmakers believe that 
they must expend additional resources in anticipation of overly intrusive judicial review, they will 
be reluctant to undertake new rulemaking initiatives, to experiment with more flexible regulatory 
techniques, and to revisit old rulemaking efforts.”). Scholars dispute whether the empirical 
evidence supports the claim that the rulemaking process has ossified. See Jason Webb Yackee & 
Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal 
Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1445–64 (2012) 
(examining success rates of proposed rules at the Department of the Interior to argue that evidence 
of ossification as a serious problem appears weak). But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking 
Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 
1495–1503 (2012) (analyzing Testing the Ossification Thesis to point out deficiencies in the study 
and suggesting improvements to better understand the breadth of ossification issues). 
 23.  For the current Executive Order, see Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012) 
(“[E]ach agency must . . . propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that 
its benefits justify its costs . . . .”). 
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mandate as well.24 The centralized Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (“OIRA”), which reviews significant regulatory actions,25 has 
institutionalized the practice of cost-benefit analysis and expanded its 
use across the administrative state.26 
Cost-benefit analysis provides a decision-making procedure for 
regulation: acquire information about the relevant risk and the effects 
of potential rules to regulate it and select a rule for which the expected 
benefits exceed the expected costs.27 Its proponents claim that it can 
counteract cognitive bias in regulatory decision-making,28 solve 
regulatory principal-agent problems,29 and police regulatory capture.30 
It has also been the target of persistent criticisms.31 
One frequent criticism of cost-benefit analysis is that it requires 
exhaustive, specific information for its calculations to be meaningful 
and, in practice, that information is often unclear, incomplete, or 
unavailable.32 I take no position on the general question of whether the 
informational demands of cost-benefit analysis are so frequently 
disproportionate to what is available that regulators should abandon 
 
 24.  For a discussion of the relationship between statutory cost-benefit mandates and the 
practice of cost-benefit analysis, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE 12–15 (2003).  
 25.  A regulatory action is “significant” if it will “[h]ave an annual effect on the economy of 
$100 million or more” or if it satisfies at least one of four other criteria. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 
3(f), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994). 
 26.  For more on OIRA, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013); and Nicholas Bagley & 
Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260 (2006). 
 27.  Some defenders of cost-benefit analysis defend it as an optimization tool. See, e.g., Steve 
P. Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Approach to 
Federal Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957, 991 (2001) (arguing in favor of a 
marginal-cost–marginal-benefit analysis). But in practice agencies using cost-benefit analysis 
more often choose a rule for which the expected benefits range exceeds the expected costs range. 
For examples, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six 
Questions (And Almost As Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167 (2014). 
 28.  Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1059 
(2000) (“[Cost-benefit analysis] is most plausibly justified on cognitive grounds—as a way of 
counteracting predictable problems in individual and social cognition.”). 
 29.  See Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political 
Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1197 (2001) (“Many of the philosophical difficulties 
with cost-benefit analysis disappear when a principal-agent perspective is taken.”). 
 30.  See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and 
Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1370 (2013) (defending cost-benefit analysis’s role in 
regulatory review on the ground that it has “the potential to reduce agency capture”). 
 31.  For leading criticisms of cost-benefit analysis, see generally ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, 
supra note 5; KYSAR, supra note 5. 
 32.  See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Precautionary Principle: Can 
They Be Reconciled?, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 771, 777–78 (2013); Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-
Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 12–13 (1998); Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The 
Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 
DUKE L.J. 1619, 1723 (2004).  
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the methodology altogether. Cost-benefit analysis may very well be 
better, for most areas of risk regulation, than alternative decision 
procedures.33 
But cost-benefit analysis is particularly unsuited to the 
regulation of emerging risks. Even defenders of cost-benefit analysis 
have conceded that information deficits can diminish its utility.34 Any 
cost or benefit predictions that an agency could offer in the analysis of 
a proposed rule to regulate an emerging risk would be speculative at 
best. The cost and benefit ranges produced by the analysis would 
provide little guidance for the choices that an agency would need to 
make in deciding which, if any, rule to promulgate. OIRA would be 
rightly skeptical of the agency’s figures, and the rule might not survive 
its review. Therefore, agencies may avoid an unproductive and 
unsuccessful cost-benefit analysis by deciding not to regulate at all. 
3. Judicial Review 
The APA permits courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”35 
Some scholars argue that judicial review of agency action ensures 
statutory compliance,36 allows monitoring of agencies,37 prevents 
 
 33.  As one defense of cost-benefit analysis puts it, “[A]t least it is quite plausible to think 
that [cost-benefit analysis], suitably modified to function as a practical decision-making tool, is 
welfare-maximizing, as compared to currently available competitor procedures . . . across a wide 
range of governmental choice situations.” MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW 
FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 62 (2006). 
 34.  See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE 
L.J. 165, 175 (1999) (“[Cost-benefit analysis] is frequently hampered by a lack of data . . . .”); see 
generally Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory Experimentation and 
Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 114 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009) 
(“Proponents of a new regulation inevitably argue that its benefits are substantial, while 
opponents inevitably argue that the costs are too high. The difficulty is that the evidence needed 
to assess such claims is almost always unavailable.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed 
Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349 (2011) (acknowledging the importance of improving the 
informational inputs into cost-benefit analysis). 
 35.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). 
 36.  Cass R. Sunstein, On the Cost and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 522 (1989) (“The most obvious goal . . . of judicial review is to increase 
the incidence of legality. Under this view, judicial review of administrative action is necessary 
above all to ensure that regulatory agencies comply with congressional commands.”). 
 37.  See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1776 (2007) (“[T]he Court has shaped administrative law in a manner that 
enables Congress—beyond the bare provisions of the APA and other statutes—to monitor agency 
action.”). 
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agency capture,38 or provides quality control for agency decision-
making.39 
In academia, however, judicial review of agency action has as 
many critics as supporters.40 One line of criticism states that judicial 
ideology influences outcomes in cases reviewing agency action.41 
Another claims that judicial review is neither sufficiently nor 
consistently deferential to agencies.42 Either way, risk-averse agencies 
have a strong incentive to only promulgate rules and risk judicial 
invalidation when they can exhaustively document their justifications. 
By now, the refrain should be clear: the hurdle judicial review 
creates for regulation generally is particularly acute for the regulation 
of emerging risks because of the information gap. Judicial review 
reinforces the dual requirements of notice and comment and cost-
benefit analysis that agencies regulating emerging risks struggle to 
meet, and it adds a further incentive to exhaustively document 
information that an agency might lack. When agencies predict that they 
will not satisfy these informational hurdles, they may postpone 
regulating emerging risks until they acquire sufficient information. 
B. Entrenchment 
Postponing regulation in the face of limited information has its 
benefits. A rule based on more thorough information is not simply a rule 
that can survive the rulemaking process; if the informational hurdles 
have any value, they should also produce a more optimal rule. But the 
costs of postponing the regulation of emerging risks often outweigh its 
benefits. Agencies are partially constrained by politics, and the political 
economy of a regulation may change over time. 
 
 38.  See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug 
of War over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 675 (1992) (“In order to prevent agency 
capture by special interest groups, the judiciary should subject agency action to rationality review 
and rigorous means-ends analysis.”). 
 39.  See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 20, at 1452 (“[J]udicial review can perform a necessary 
‘quality control’ function.”). 
 40.  See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
1285, 1289 (2014) (claiming that judicial review of agency action “has come under searing criticism 
for undermining effective governance”). 
 41.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 58 
DUKE L.J. 2193, 2209 (2009) (“[J]udicial review of administrative action shows a strong effect from 
the political inclinations of federal judges . . . [even though] . . . existing administrative law 
principles are best understood as a self-conscious effort to prevent this state of affairs.”). 
 42.  See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 20, at 1419 (“Because the agencies perceive that the 
reviewing courts are inconsistent in the degree to which they are deferential, they are constrained 
to prepare for the worst-case scenario on judicial review. This can be extremely resource-intensive 
and time-consuming.”). 
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Changes in law can create path dependence: large, 
unanticipated future effects from seemingly small initial changes.43 
Sometimes a change in law will entrench the ability of political forces 
to resist future status quo changes.44 Scholars have long noted that the 
adoption of a constitutional provision or the enactment of a statute can 
lead to entrenchment and prevent amendment or repeal.45 Inaction, just 
as much as action, can also lead to entrenchment. A failure to pass 
legislation or regulation during a critical political window can entrench 
a lightly regulated status quo.46 
Failing to regulate emerging risks at an early stage can cause 
two types of entrenchment: interest group entrenchment and social 
norm entrenchment. Preventing interest group entrenchment often 
justifies early regulation of emerging risks. Preventing social norm 
entrenchment is more normatively problematic, but it still may justify 
early regulation in a limited set of cases. 
 
 43.  For a rigorous analysis of the multiple meanings of “path dependence” as applied to law, 
see Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in 
a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 606–23 (2001). 
 44.  For a similar analysis using the phrase “lock-in” instead of entrenchment, see generally 
Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998). 
 45.  See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 
85 GEO. L.J. 491, 502–09 (1997) (defining “legislative” and “cross-temporal” entrenchment). 
Private law can be a source of entrenchment as well; Daryl J. Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, 
Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 124 YALE L.J. 400, 454–56 (2015) (arguing that informal 
entrenchment may result from measures that strengthen allies, weaken opponents, change 
composition of a political community, or change decisionmaking processes); John O. McGinnis & 
Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. 
L. REV. 385, 388–89 (2003) (arguing that formal constitutional and legislative entrenchment in the 
United States is generally forbidden and undesirable); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Essay, 
Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1666 (2002) (arguing that a 
constitutional rule barring formal entrenchment should be eliminated); John C. Roberts & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 
91 CAL. L. REV. 1773, 1775 (2003) (using the death penalty and abortion to explain the concept of 
entrenchment); see generally Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment through Private Law: 
Binding Local Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879 (2011). 
 46.  The entrenchment problem and the importance of the pre-entrenchment political window 
have been acknowledged in the emerging technologies literature. See, e.g., Albert C. Lin, 
Revamping Our Approach to Emerging Technologies, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1309 (2011) (“[N]ew 
technologies also raise the specter of adverse health effects, environmental degradation and 
disaster, and even dehumanization, should those technologies go awry. . . . Addressing these 
problems becomes especially difficult when technological systems become entrenched.”); Thomas 
O. McGarity & Karl O. Bayer, Federal Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 VAND. L. 
REV. 461, 478–79 (1983) (“Experience with other potentially dangerous technologies, however, 
repeatedly has demonstrated the value of assessing the risks to man and the environment before 
the technologies attain widespread use.”). 
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1. Interest Group Entrenchment 
Interest group influence pervades risk regulation. Interest 
group theory predicts that, in legislative and regulatory processes, the 
interests of small, concentrated groups will prevail over the interests of 
a diffuse public.47 Concentrated interest groups are better able to solve 
collective action problems than larger groups because each individual 
member of those groups has a higher per capita stake in the group effort 
and the group can more easily police free riding.48 When interest groups 
become repeat players, they augment these advantages by acquiring 
strategic knowledge and the will to sacrifice short-term losses for long-
term goals.49 
Many of the statutes and rules that regulate risks to health, 
safety, and the environment confer benefits on a diffuse public—
including future generations, foreigners, and nonhuman animals—and 
costs on concentrated, repeat-player interest groups, especially risk-
creating firms and their trade associations. For these reasons, the 
political viability of risk regulation statutes or rules can depend 
considerably on the interest group power of such regulated firms.50 
Emerging risks can bring with them a brief political window in 
which concentrated interest groups may not have yet entrenched 
themselves. This can happen for several reasons. The firms may be 
start-ups lacking any lobbying relationships. Even if some firms in the 
industry have retained lobbyists, the firms may have not yet organized 
together into a trade association that can police free riding. Even if a 
trade association has been organized, it might not have developed 
relationships with powerful officials or gained the requisite experience 
for repeat-player advantages. 
Interest groups can become entrenched while agencies wait to 
acquire information before regulating. The firms that would be 
 
 47.  E.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 144 (20th prtg. 2002). For a 
critique of these arguments, see generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND 
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991). 
 48.  See OLSON, supra note 47, at 44. 
 49.  See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (arguing that organized and influential 
groups have adapted to benefit from pre-existing rules). 
 50.  See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative 
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 128 (1998) (“[L]arge regulated parties enjoy much greater presence 
in agency decisionmaking processes than do public interest groups and other outside parties.”); 
Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 
ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 464 (1999) (“[W]ithin niches of an agency's policy domain, firms in regulated 
industries and interest groups with strong central staffs still occupy a favored position in 
regulatory and political structures that allows them an advantage in influencing agency 
decisions.”). 
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regulated may grow, and the industry may organize. In some cases, the 
industry may expand employment, which gives a wider swath of the 
public a stake in the continuation of the risky technology. If agencies 
subsequently discover a strong case for aggressive regulation, newly 
entrenched risk-creating firms may be able to block forthcoming 
statutes or rules.51 For this reason, industry has a strong incentive to 
delay regulation, and existing administrative law gives them tools to 
pressure agencies to do so. 
2. Social Norm Entrenchment 
Social norm entrenchment is subtler. It occurs when some new 
risky technology gains sufficient widespread public acceptance that new 
regulation or legislation restricting it would fail even without interest 
group influence.52 Imagine, for example, that mobile phones really did 
significantly increase the risk of cancer.53 In the early 1990s, only a 
small percentage of the population of the United States used mobile 
phones,54 so it likely would have been politically possible to restrict 
them. If new evidence accumulated suggesting that mobile phones 
caused cancer today, it is not inconceivable that some regulation would 
still be politically viable. Perhaps the spread of texting has made voice 
calls less necessary or perhaps Bluetooth devices could be mandated. 
But there is no doubt that the widespread use of mobile phones would 
make regulation more difficult to achieve. Entrenched 
 
 51.  Eugene Volokh calls this a “political power slippery slope.” Eugene Volokh, The 
Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1114 (2003). He explains: “Decision A 
may thus change the balance of political power by empowering an interest group that might use 
this power to promote B; getting to A first and then to B would thus be politically easier than 
getting to B directly (though of course still not certain).” Id. at 1115. Note that in all of Volokh’s 
examples, he is concerned with government action, rather than a decision not to regulate. But 
there is no obvious reason why, for some of his examples, a similar argument could not be made 
for the latter. 
 52.  For similar arguments, see Gillette, supra note 44, at 832–41, analyzing the lock-in 
effects of norms, and Volokh, supra note 51, 1077–105, analyzing “attitude-altering slippery 
slopes.” 
 53.  According to the National Institutes of Health, “[T]o date there is no evidence from 
studies of cells, animals, or humans that radiofrequency energy can cause cancer.” Cell Phones 
and Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH (June 24, 2013), 
http://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/risk/radiation/cell-phones-fact-sheet 
[http://perma.cc/HM2M-4M7K] 
 54.  According to one wireless industry survey, there were an estimated 5,283,055 wireless 
subscribers in 1990, 7,557,148 in 1991, and 11,032,753 in 1992. See CTIA’s Annual Survey Says 
US Wireless Providers Handled 3.2 Trillion Megabytes of Data Traffic in 2013 for a 120 Percent 
Increase over 2012, CTIA (June 17, 2014), http://www.ctia.org/resource-library/press-
releases/archive/ctia-annual-survey-2013 [perma.cc/P4D5-6F6Y]; Background on CTIA’s Wireless 
Industry Survey, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/Facts-Stats/ctia_survey_ye_2014_ 
graphics.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (last visited Oct. 19, 2015) [http://perma.cc/F8QG-AX54]. 
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telecommunications firms might lobby against regulation, or dispute 
whatever scientific evidence supported the cancer link, as the tobacco 
firms did for decades. But there would likely be public opposition even 
in the absence of industry lobbying—that is social norm 
entrenchment.55 
The case for taking early action to prevent interest group 
entrenchment is straightforward. If interest group power will constrain 
a democratically legitimate and justified regulatory solution in the 
future, it is likely worth such early action to preserve that option.56 The 
normative case for preventing social norm entrenchment is more 
complicated. Even if a regulation is otherwise justified, the fact that a 
democratic majority opposes it is at least plausibly a reason to reject it. 
Any argument about limiting the ability of future popular majorities to 
govern their own fate is problematic. At a minimum, whether it is 
legitimate for the state to act so as to influence majority opinion is an 
open normative question. As one constitutional law scholar has argued, 
“Actions that are later in time presumably more accurately track the 
current desires of those who will actually be affected by those actions 
and who, therefore, have the stronger claim to legitimate input into the 
decisionmaking process.”57 
There are, however, at least three plausible scenarios in which 
social norm entrenchment might reflect something other than genuine 
disagreement about values. If any of these arguments apply for a 
particular emerging risk, agencies might be justified in using the 
moratorium power to prevent social norms surrounding that risk from 
becoming entrenched. 
First, consider the unusual case of reverse social norm 
entrenchment—the possibility that some event will cause the public to 
oppose the introduction of an emerging technology for which the 
benefits outweigh the risks. For example, consider the early days of 
 
 55.  Volokh argues that the public can be misled by the “is-ought fallacy”:  
[People] erroneously assume [ ] that just because the law allows some government 
action . . . actions of that sort must be proper. If this error is common, then one might 
generally worry that the government's implementing decision A will indeed lead people 
to fallaciously assume that A is right, which will then make it easier to implement B.  
Volokh, supra note 51, at 1079. This Article’s argument is the mirror image of Volokh’s: the public 
will assume that just become some risky activity is legal and widely practiced, it must be 
innocuous.  
 56.  Volokh defends this type of reasoning by taking the perspective of a voter rather than a 
society: “This approach might at first seem improperly paternalistic or anti-majoritarian, but it 
simply reflects political reality. . . . So if we do think that implementing A would lead others to 
support B while we ourselves would continue to oppose B, that's a reason for us to oppose A.”  Id. 
at 1104. 
 57.  Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1592 
(1988). 
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passenger air travel, in which the public was fearful about the new 
technology.58 It is conceivable that some early crash might have created 
popular momentum favoring restriction of the technology, even though 
its benefits outweighed its risks, possibly at that time and most 
certainly in the future. 
Cognitive science has demonstrated that we process information 
using the availability heuristic—“estimating the probability of an event 
on the basis of how easily instances of it can be brought to mind.”59 We 
also will estimate the probability of a risk to be higher if the risk is 
particularly salient or vivid.60 When many individuals in a group 
overestimate the likelihood of a risk because of the availability 
heuristic, these “individual uses of the availability heuristic increase 
the public availability of data pointing to a particular interpretation or 
conclusion, and this increase in availability then triggers reinforcing 
individual responses,” resulting in an availability cascade.61 
Availability cascades may have, for example, caused the 
disproportionate public reaction to vivid, high profile examples of 
health, safety, and environmental harm like the outrage over the Love 
Canal toxic waste site, the Alar pesticide scare, and airplane crashes.62 
A moratorium or other early limitations on an emerging 
technology could prevent an early, vivid, but unrepresentative 
manifestation of its risk that could lead to an availability cascade and 
overly restrictive permanent regulation. Market incentives may not be 
sufficient because, even if the median risk-creating firm in an industry 
is sufficiently cautious to avoid an early incident, the least cautious firm 
can still create a problem for the whole industry. This unconventional 
sort of market failure justifies action against reverse social norm 
entrenchment. 
Second, scholars have long recognized that many risky activities 
have a social meaning.63 Our perceptions of risk and our beliefs about 
how to regulate them are influenced by “cultural cognition,” defined as 
 
 58.  Elaine Iljon Foreman et al., Flight or Fright? Psychological Approaches to the Treatment 
of Fear of Flying, in AVIATION MENTAL HEALTH: PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR AIR TRAVEL 
70 (Tony Hubbard & Robert Bor eds., 2006). 
 59.  Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 683, 706 (1999).  
 60.  See id. at 707. 
 61.  Id. at 712. 
 62.  See id. at 691–703.  Kuran and Sunstein’s examples are drawn from AARON B. 
WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT TRUE? A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES 
(1995). 
 63.  Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 963–71 
(1995) (describing the social meaning of wearing motorcycle helmets in the Soviet Union, wearing 
helmets in hockey, and dueling). 
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“the psychological disposition of persons to conform their factual beliefs 
about the instrumental efficacy (or perversity) of law to their cultural 
evaluations of the activities subject to regulation.”64 Risk perceptions of 
guns, smoking, nuclear power, and climate change all exhibit the effects 
of cultural cognition.65 If, for example, one identifies with hierarchical 
or individualistic cultural groups, one is likely to be skeptical about 
climate change.66 Alternatively, if one identifies with egalitarian or 
communitarian cultural groups, one is more apt to believe that nuclear 
power poses significant risks.67 
Cultural cognition might raise a special problem for perceptions 
of emerging risks. One recent study examined the effects of cultural 
cognition on the perception of nanotechnology’s risks and benefits.68 In 
the study, one group of participants was “told nothing about 
nanotechnology other than it is a scientific process for producing and 
manipulating very small particles.”69 When participants in that group 
were asked whether the benefits of nanotechnology were greater than 
its risks, there was no divergence in answer based on cultural 
worldview.70 Another group was given a two-paragraph explanation of 
nanotechnology’s risks and benefits.71 In that informed group, the 
respondents displayed widely different perceptions of risk depending on 
their cultural worldview: 86% of hierarchical individualists said the 
benefits were greater than its risks, but only 23% of egalitarian or 
communitarians said so.72 
If the results of the nanotechnology study are generalizable, it 
suggests that being exposed to information about an emerging risk 
might alter opinions about the risks and benefits of that technology 
through the process of cultural cognition. It is possible that risky 
technologies might have a “cultural cognition window.” At the 
beginning of the window, the risky activity might have no particular 
social meaning. But as certain social groups begin to participate in the 
activity or as it becomes otherwise associated with a specific cultural 
identity, perceptions about the risk and views about whether and how 
 
 64.  Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 149, 151–52 (2006). 
 65.  See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 134–42 (2007). 
 66.  Id. at 140–41. 
 67.  See id. at 139–40. 
 68.  See generally Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural cognition of the risks and benefits of 
nanotechnology, 4 NATURE NANOTECH. 87 (2009). 
 69.  Id. at 87. 
 70.  Id. at 87–88. 
 71.  Id. at 87. 
 72.  Id. at 88. 
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it ought to be regulated calcify. This polarization leads to political 
obstacles to justified regulation—social norm entrenchment. A 
moratorium, by preventing any social group from participating in a new 
risky activity, delays the process by which the technology would acquire 
a cultural meaning and reduces the possibility that future debates 
about how to regulate it became entangled in cultural cognition. 
Third, future majorities might oppose regulation temporarily 
because of cognitive dissonance—the psychological process that causes 
us to discount new evidence that would show our earlier choices to have 
been mistaken.73 Consider again the case of mobile phones and cancer. 
Mobile phones have become so interwoven into our lives that cognitive 
dissonance might be a powerful force resisting new regulation, should 
evidence accumulate that they are sufficiently carcinogenic to be 
banned. A moratorium on mobile phones—or at least on mobile phones 
that are held close to the brain—might have allowed us to precommit 
ourselves against the predictable effects of cognitive dissonance.74 The 
argument would be especially strong if the social norm entrenchment 
was temporary—that is, if cognitive dissonance merely delayed our 
acceptance of the evidence justifying the ban. 
These examples suggest that preventing social norm 
entrenchment will be justified in some limited cases when the change 
in social norms will predictably impair future decisionmaking. 
Preventing interest group entrenchment is justified in a wider set of 
cases. Existing administrative law creates the risk of entrenchment and 
thereby often prevents effective regulation of emerging risks. 
II. ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR REGULATING EMERGING RISKS 
Scholars have offered three alternative models for regulating 
under conditions of factual uncertainty, which I call the Precautionary, 
Common Law, and Laboratory of Democracy models. These models 
were not specifically designed for the problem of emerging risks. They 
are, undoubtedly, motivated by deeper ideological commitments about 
 
 73.  See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Risk Control, 24 ENVTL. L. 887, 914 (1994) 
(“Another form of cognitive dissonance also biases public risk perceptions. People are closely 
wedded to their current set of beliefs and relatively unwilling to change their beliefs, regardless of 
the strength of contrary evidence. Pre-existing opinions, even those arbitrarily held, overwhelm 
even reliable contradictory evidence . . . .”).  
 74.  In addition to the general objection to any precommitment argument that the future 
agent will have a more legitimate claim to decide for itself, there is the additional objection that 
groups, which will not all agree with the precommitment, are relevantly different than individuals, 
who at least have some claim to be acting for their future selves. For an objection along those lines, 
see Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities 
of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1757–61 (2003). 
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the proper role of the administrative state. But because each of these 
models responds to the problem of factual uncertainty, they have come 
to frame the scholarly debate about how to regulate emerging risks. I 
argue that the Precautionary, Common Law, and Laboratory of 
Democracy models ultimately offer unsatisfactory solutions to the 
problem of regulating emerging risks. Identifying the strengths and 
weaknesses of these models will clarify the need for the Experimentalist 
model that Part III introduces. 
A. Precautionary 
The manifesto of the Precautionary model is the Precautionary 
Principle. It states, in one famous formulation, that, “[w]hen an activity 
raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, 
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect 
relationships are not fully established scientifically.”75 How the 
Precautionary Principle should be operationalized is not immediately 
obvious, in part because its advocates support it for various reasons.76 
Some defenders of the Precautionary model appeal directly to 
deontological moral intuitions, relying on a distinction between doing 
and allowing harm or otherwise emphasizing the collective moral 
agency of the community.77 Others offer the related but distinct 
argument that regulating through cost-benefit analysis requires 
“putting a price on human life,” which they contend is intrinsically 
wrong.78 Even if human death and suffering could be quantified, some 
argue, it is immoral to weigh those costs against economic benefits.79 
 
 75.  The Wingspread Consensus Statement on the Precautionary Principle, SCIENCE & ENVTL. 
HEALTH NETWORK (Jan. 1998), http://www.sehn.org/wing.html [http://perma.cc/R36P-HR6C]. 
Another leading statement is the Rio Declaration, which states: “Where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” U.N. Conference on Environment 
and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. DOC. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/ 
aconf15126-1annex1.htm [http://perma.cc/GKF3-3V32]. 
 76.  See John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY 
ENVT’L. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 17 (identifying as a principal criticism of the Precautionary Principle 
that “[t]here are many versions of it and none gives explicit direction for individual cases,” but 
contending that “it is perfectly possible to make sense out of the numerous formulations of the 
[P]recautionary [P]rinciple by breaking it down into elements and charting the variation within 
those elements”). 
 77.  E.g., KYSAR, supra note 5, at 46–67. 
 78.  See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 5, at 8 (“[H]uman life, health, and 
nature cannot be described meaningfully in monetary terms; they are priceless.”); Steven Kelman, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, REG. AM. ENTERPRISE INST. J. ON GOV’T & SOC’Y, Jan.–
Feb. 1981 at 33, 38 (“[S]ome things . . . are priceless . . . such as life or health.”). 
 79.  E.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 5, at 61–90. 
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In addition to the moral case for the Precautionary model, some 
scholars argue that there are empirical reasons to take a precautionary 
approach. They point to the complexity of natural systems and the 
inherent uncertainty of scientific predictions about how the natural 
environment will respond to changes.80 Some risks, they contend, 
involve the possibility of irreversible damage.81 Other risks are 
catastrophic, on such a scale that any non-precautionary approach 
would be disastrous.82 
With the diversity of arguments supporting the Precautionary 
model, it is unsurprising that there is no consensus on how to 
operationalize it. What action does the Precautionary Principle require 
when a technology, like nuclear power, both causes and mitigates risks 
to the environment or when a new technology, like genetically modified 
foods, has the potential to both benefit and harm human health? Critics 
of the Precautionary Principle argue that the Principle is indeterminate 
in these risk-risk tradeoff scenarios, in which regulators cannot simply 
choose the course of action that avoids all health or environmental 
costs.83 
Some precautionary thinkers have responded that risk-risk 
tradeoffs are rare—most regulatory decisions involve a tradeoff 
between economic costs and risks to health, safety, or the 
environment.84 Regardless of whether that claim is true in general, it is 
false for the emerging risks considered here. Fracking creates multiple 
environmental risks, but, by shifting energy production from coal to 
natural gas, it reduces the climate risks of carbon emissions.85 E-
cigarettes might be a net positive for public health, if—and this is a big 
if—they help smokers quit and do not addict nonsmokers. Autonomous 
vehicles have the potential to cut traffic fatalities down to a fraction of 
current numbers.86 At least for these emerging risks, the argument that 
some versions of the Precautionary Principle are indeterminate in risk-
risk situations cannot be dismissed. 
 
 80.  E.g., KYSAR, supra note 5, at 71–90. 
 81.  See, e.g., id. at 90–98 (arguing that cost-benefit analysis in environmental contexts often 
cannot and should not provide a quantitative estimate of consequences). 
 82.  E.g., id. 
 83.  See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 26–
34 (2005) (arguing that the precautionary principle is paralyzing if taken at face value); Frank B. 
Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851, 859–60 
(arguing that even actions aimed at reducing harm carry some risk of causing harm) (1996). 
 84.  See Steffen Foss Hansen & Joel A. Tickner, Putting Risk-Risk Tradeoffs in Perspective: 
A Response to Graham and Wiener, 11 J. RISK RES. 475, 476 (2008) (discussing the examples of 
mercury in fish and tropospheric ozone). 
 85.  See infra Part IV. 
 86.  See id. 
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Of course, the state could ban all new and potentially risky 
technologies, but this radical version drains some of the intuitive appeal 
of the Precautionary Principle.87 What intuitive appeal it retains might 
be influenced by loss aversion.88 A society that faithfully implemented 
that kind of Precautionary Principle might be a society without 
antibiotics, air travel, or mobile phones.89 The pervasiveness of 
scientific uncertainty, especially with respect to emerging risks, can cut 
both ways. Foreclosing all innovation precludes the possibility of 
learning that some risks might be more innocuous than they initially 
appeared. 
Even for regulatory decisions that do not involve risk-risk 
tradeoffs, it is difficult to defend total insensitivity to disproportionate 
economic costs or benefits. Some have argued that economic costs 
translate into health costs because “wealth leads to health,”90 but one 
need not accept that view to agree that economic costs can cause 
significant suffering, especially when the distributional effect falls on 
the least well-off. These and other conceptual difficulties with simple 
interpretations of the Precautionary Principle have led to proposals for 
its refinement, some of which are compatible with considering economic 
costs and benefits.91 
Despite the Precautionary model’s shortcomings, precautionary 
thinking does offer important insights for regulating emerging risks. In 
particular, its caution about scientific uncertainty raises doubt about 
the advisability of early cost-benefit analyses and counsels in favor of 
early research into risky emerging technologies. Although risks to 
health, safety, or the environment are rarely literally irreversible, it is 
critical to consider the difficulty of reversing such regulation after 
entrenchment has occurred. 
The Experimentalist model offers a distinct alternative to some 
implementations of the Precautionary model, but it could also be 
 
 87.  For a summary of other responses to the risk-risk tradeoff objection to the Precautionary 
Principle, see Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from Its Critics, 2011 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1285, 1316–17 (2011). 
 88.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 83, at 35–63. 
 89.  For a similar argument, see id. at 25. 
 90.  For a qualified defense of that view, see generally, Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health 
Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1996). 
 91.  See, e.g., Stephen Charest, Bayesian Approaches to the Precautionary Principle, 12 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 265, 272–277 (2002) (advocating a Bayesian approach to risk analysis); Daniel 
A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 936–44 (2011) (weighing scientific and economic 
uncertainties for the example of climate change mitigation); Mark Geistfeld, Implementing the 
Precautionary Principle, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11326, 11328–32 (2001) (suggesting that the 
precautionary principle and cost-benefit analysis are not incompatible). 
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considered a more nuanced way of implementing the precautionary 
vision for the regulation of emerging risks.92 
B. Common Law 
The Precautionary model’s mirror image is the Common Law 
model. In its purest form, the Common Law model would leave those 
injured by a new risky technology to their common law remedies. The 
more commonly defended form of the Common Law model is a 
temporary one, in which the market is allowed to innovate with new 
risky technologies until agencies develop information that indicates 
that regulation is warranted. But if firms are able to thwart regulation, 
the temporary Common Law model can collapse into the permanent 
Common Law model. 
Some scholars have defended the permanent Common Law 
model for risk regulation.93 The absence of regulation would allow for 
unlimited market innovation, but it would come at a crippling cost to 
those on whom the risk would fall. Common Law enthusiasts argue that 
the ex post penalties of tort law can provide some ex ante deterrence 
and protection from risk, but there are several well-established 
limitations on this deterrent effect. 
First, because of causation, standing, evidential, and incentive 
problems, tort law is generally ineffective at reducing certain types of 
environmental or health risks.  These include risks dispersed across a 
broad public,94 risks that are caused by diffuse sources,95 and risks that 
 
 92.  For a distinct, but related, argument about how to reconcile cost-benefit analysis with 
the Precautionary Principle, see generally Driesen, supra note 32. 
 93.  See, e.g., Butler, supra note 6 (arguing that “common law rules should be the 
presumptively optimal method of controlling local environmental harms”); Meiners & Yandle, 
supra note 6 (arguing that “the common law, aided by state-level controls, could have done much 
of the job needed to protect the environment”). 
 94.  See Christopher H. Schroeder, Lost in the Translation: What Environmental Regulation 
Does that Tort Cannot Duplicate, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 601 (2002) (explaining that in cases 
“where harm falls broadly on a large group and any individual harm does not rise above a threshold 
necessary to constitute an actionable injury . . . the sources of the harm may be causing harm that 
in the aggregate justifies intervention, but no one will be able to litigate.”).  
 95. See id. (explaining that cases involving “concentrated effects from diffuse origins, present 
different doctrinal problems, especially ones having to do with the cause-in-fact requirement” and 
noting that joint and several liability is not always an answer because “the range of cases to which 
joint and several liability applies is under continual pressure from defendants claiming it to be 
unfair.”). Schroeder emphasizes the special problem of tort claims that combine dispersed harms 
and diffuse origins. See id. at 601–02. For a similar argument, see Adam D.K. Abelkop, Tort Law 
as an Environmental Policy Instrument, 92 OR. L. REV. 381, 385 (surveying the limits of tort law 
regulation of environmental risks and concluding that “in most circumstances, tort law will not 
function efficiently and effectively as a lone policy instrument; but nonetheless, it serves important 
functions as a complement to regulatory rules.”). 
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are latent for decades,96 let alone risks to future generations, nonhuman 
animals, or the natural environment. 
Second, emerging risks are especially ill-suited to tort law 
because tort claims are generally limited to injuries that were or should 
have been foreseeable to defendants.97 The potential injuries that 
emerging risks might cause are, by definition, clouded by scientific 
uncertainty, so tortfeasors will have at least a potentially successful 
defense in arguing they were unforeseeable. 
Third, tort defendants in emerging risk cases may be judgment-
proof.98 Firms innovating with new risky technologies are more likely 
to be start-ups than established incumbents. If the risky technology 
turns out to cause significant injuries, the market for the firm’s product 
may evaporate and the firm may be bankrupt by the time that all 
injured plaintiffs are able to sue. 
Fourth, relatedly, the solvency of defendants in the tort system 
relies on insurance coverage, and insurers are unlikely to cover 
emerging risks.99 Insurers will only cover risks that they can classify 
with some confidence.100  The claims that will be paid out for emerging 
risks will depend on factual predictions about the likelihood and 
magnitude of injuries that would be unknown at the time of 
underwriting. In addition, if the firms innovating with new risky 
technologies are small start-ups, they will likely be unable to self-
insure. 
 
 96.  See Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1446 (2005) (explaining that, with latent harms, the “passage of time not 
only complicates proof, but also increases the risk that a defendant will no longer be financially 
viable, assuming that the defendant can even be identified. Compounding plaintiffs' difficulties, 
statutes of limitations may bar suit . . . .”). 
 97.  See David G. Owen, Bending Nature, Bending Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 569, 588–605 (2010) 
(explaining that, despite some doctrinal innovations in the 1960s and 1970s, the foreseeability 
requirement continues to limit tort liability for injuries caused by what were emerging risks at the 
time of the tortious act). 
 98.  See, e.g., Maksim Rakhlin, Regulating Nanotechnology: A Private-Public Insurance 
Solution, 2008 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2 (2008) (discussing the judgment-proof problem in the 
context of nanotechnology risks and noting that many nanotechnology companies are start-ups). 
 99.  For an example in the context of nanotechnology, see id. at 32 (“[S]parse exposure and 
toxicology research, a lack of nano-related accident history, and the breadth of nanotechnology 
applications leave insurers without reasonable means to classify the risk posed by 
nanomaterials.”). 
 100.  See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 942, 946–47 (1988) (“When faced with excessive uncertainty regarding . . . 
probabilities, an insurer . . . cannot estimate its probable success in diversifying risk through 
pooling, and . . . cannot determine the correct price to charge for its risk-bearing services.”). 
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These theoretical limitations on the ability of tort law to regulate 
risks are predictable.101  In the case of environmental risks, there is 
“[e]mpirical evidence suggest[ing] that environmental torts suits 
currently send a weak deterrent signal.”102 
The more sophisticated defense of the Common Law model 
argues not that the state should abandon public regulation altogether, 
but that it should wait until market innovation has produced enough 
information that the state can regulate effectively.103 The temporary 
Common Law model is the tacit position of those who support the status 
quo, in which agencies wait to acquire information about emerging risks 
before regulating. 
All of the criticisms of the permanent Common Law model apply 
to the temporary Common Law model until the eventual regulation can 
happen. But there are two additional problems with the temporary 
Common Law model. Its passive mechanism for acquiring information 
diminishes the quality of regulation and its waiting period allows 
regulatory entrenchment. 
Market innovation may not produce information useful for 
regulation for three reasons. First, much of the information relevant to 
regulation—what pollutants are being emitted, what carcinogens are in 
the byproducts, who might be exposed, what symptoms are being 
observed—may be held by risk-creating firms or entities.104 Second, 
because risk-creating firms have an interest in influencing public 
perceptions about the risks of their activities, they have the incentive 
to conceal unfavorable information about those risks, selectively reveal 
more favorable information, or at least prolong uncertainty to the 
extent it serves their regulatory interests. Third, even if market 
innovation does reveal some information about the risk, the 
uncontrolled market action lacks even the most rudimentary controls 
 
 101.  The tort system may still serve an important purpose for risk regulation: providing 
information that agencies can use in public law regulation. See Wendy Wagner, When All Else 
Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 695 (2007) (“[T]he tort 
system can be more effective than the regulatory system in accessing the various types of 
information needed to inform regulatory decisions.”). 
 102.  Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (1993). 
 103.  To be clear, my claim is not that scholars have defended the temporary Common Law 
model. I contend that it is the implication of supporting a Cost-Benefit model that allows agencies 
to wait to regulate until they have received sufficient information to conduct a meaningful 
analysis. Jonathan Adler comes closest to explicitly embracing that position. See Jonathan H. 
Adler, More Sorry than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary Principle and the Proposed International 
Biosafety Protocol, 35 TEX. INT’L L.J. 173, 205 (2000) (arguing for shifting the burden to the state 
to provide sufficient evidence of harm before regulating). 
 104.  For examples and a more detailed theoretical account of why firms have little incentive 
to make public information that could be relevant to regulation public, see Wagner, supra note 32, 
at 1625–59. 
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of experimentation, so inferring causal effects may be exceedingly 
difficult. 
The net effect of relying on interested, uncoordinated outside 
parties to voluntarily produce information for regulation is that 
agencies may be late to act when emerging risks justify aggressive 
regulation and will be less informed when they do act. Moreover, even 
if market innovation does provide some information about the costs and 
benefits of a risky technology, it may not provide information about the 
potential means to mitigate the risk. Because regulatory agencies take 
a passive role in the Common Law model, they will be less prepared to 
evaluate competing strategies for regulation when they acquire 
sufficient information about the risk to regulate. 
Finally and most importantly, the Common Law model may lead 
to entrenchment. Firms opposed to regulation may grow and organize 
into effective interest groups that can thwart regulation. Social norms 
can develop during the period of market innovation that later impede 
effective decisionmaking. Of course, to some proponents of the Common 
Law model, entrenchment is a feature, not a flaw. But, if and when 
regulation is justified, entrenchment can turn the temporary Common 
Law model into a permanent Common Law regime and prevent 
effective regulation. 
C. Laboratory of Democracy 
Justice Brandeis wrote that “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of 
the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”105 The Laboratory 
of Democracy model thereby serves as the legal baseline for regulating 
emerging risks in the United States because, in the absence of federal 
legislation preempting state laws, the states are free to innovate with 
different regulatory regimes.106 Unlike market innovation, which can at 
best only produce information about the costs and benefits of a risky 
technology, policy innovation can provide information about regulatory 
options as well.107 In the context of emerging risks, the hope is that 
 
 105.  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 106.  But see William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1560 (2007) (“In our post-New Deal era, most 
areas of law traditionally dominated by state and local choice include at least limited federal 
involvement.”). 
 107.  See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 7, at 287 (“The private sector institutions of learning 
by monitoring suggest a public sector model of problem solving adapted to a polity . . . . The model 
requires linked systems of local and inter-local or federal pooling of information . . . so that actors 
scrutinize their initial understandings of problems and feasible solutions.”); see also Yair Listokin, 
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states will simultaneously test out the plausible regulatory 
alternatives, and federal regulators can then select the approach with 
the best benefit-cost ratio.108 
The Laboratory of Democracy model has considerable appeal. 
Although the federal government can experiment with multiple 
regulatory alternatives, one might think the states are more likely to 
exhaust the plausible regulatory options because each state 
“experiment” will be designed by a different decision-maker.109 Because 
the states are ideologically heterogeneous, there might be political will 
for certain policy innovations in some states that is lacking at the 
federal level. The optimal regulatory regime may vary from state to 
state because local conditions differ, and state governments and their 
electorates will be more familiar with those idiosyncratic conditions.110 
There is, however, a counterintuitive strain in the federalism 
literature which argues that states innovate at a less-than-socially-
efficient level.111 The argument is that state and local innovation face a 
collective action problem. Because politicians in one jurisdiction can 
free ride on the experience of other jurisdictions, they have little 
individual incentive to innovate.112 While these arguments may be 
plausible a priori, at least the brief histories of the three emerging risks 
analyzed below demonstrate that state and local governments 
sometimes do innovate, even if not at the socially efficient level.113 
 
Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 514 (2008) (“Other jurisdictions can 
costlessly observe the outcomes of these high-variance/high-expected-value policies and adopt the 
policies if they are successful while avoiding their negative effects if they are failures.”). 
 108.  See Listokin, supra note 107, at 483 (“If the policy succeeds, then policymakers will have 
achieved an ideal outcome and will no longer need to search for alternatives.”). But see Orly Lobel, 
The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 380 (2004) (“The most sophisticated articulations of the governance 
model, however, understand competition and diversity not as a temporary strategy before choosing 
the superior solution . . . but rather as a means for continuous change and improvement.”). 
 109.  See, e.g., Listokin, supra note 107, at 513 (“[L]ocalities will naturally experiment because 
different populations will have different policy goals. In other words, different jurisdictions will 
pursue new policies because the new policies have higher expected value for that particular 
jurisdiction than do existing policies . . . .”). 
 110.  See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 7, at 317 (“[C]itizen users have unique knowledge of 
those particulars of their own, local circumstances that must be taken into account[;] . . . those 
exposed to potential side effects are likely to have the sharpest eye for threats to their well-being.”). 
 111.  The origin of these arguments is Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: 
Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980). See also Brian Galle & Joseph 
Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY 
L.J. 1333, 1334 (2009) (reviewing responses to Rose-Ackerman’s claims and concluding that “there 
are no demonstrably overwhelming replies”). 
 112.  Rose-Ackerman, supra note 111, at 594. 
 113.  For more on state responses to fracking, e-cigarettes, and autonomous vehicles, see  infra 
Part IV. 
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The stronger criticism of the Laboratory of Democracy model is 
that when states do innovate, those innovations will not be reliable 
experiments. The worst-case scenario for state innovation is the so-
called “race to the bottom.”114 The premise behind the race-to-the-
bottom argument, as applied to risk regulation, is that risky activities 
are mobile.115 Consequently, in the absence of any federal preemptive 
legislation, risk-creating firms will seek to move operations to the state 
or locality that will provide them with the least restrictive regulatory 
regime. The firms may be able to acquire this regime through sheer 
interest group power, such as by making campaign contributions to 
legislators. State and local legislators might also believe that attracting 
the risky activity is in their constituents’ interests, if moving operations 
to the state will increase tax revenue or provide employment 
opportunities.116 What makes this process a “race” is that firms can pit 
states or localities against one another competitively and move to the 
jurisdiction with the most attractive bid. The firms might not even need 
to direct the bidding war themselves; states will anticipate the race to 
the bottom and strategize accordingly.117 
One possible result of a race to the bottom is a Common Law 
regime of the worst kind: the risky activity will migrate to a jurisdiction 
with a weak, nonexistent, or captured regulatory infrastructure. This 
jurisdiction may have a weak tax base, suffer from high unemployment, 
or be ideologically opposed to aggressive risk regulation. If these 
conditions are present, the regulatory regime imposed by that state or 
 
 114.  The literature is voluminous and contentious. The recent debate started with Richard L. 
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for 
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992). For leading critiques, see 
generally Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There A “Race” and Is It “To 
the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental 
Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996). For a reply, see generally Richard L. Revesz, The Race 
to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 
(1997). 
 115.  See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in 
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 
(1977) (“Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state or community may 
rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high environmental standards that entail substantial costs 
for industry . . . for fear that the resulting environmental gains will be more than offset by 
movement of capital to other areas with lower standards.”). 
 116.  See Esty, supra note 114, at 603–04 (“Regulators and the politicians who appoint them 
perceive that by cutting environmental standards and stealing a march on other jurisdictions in 
the competition for new investment, jobs, and industrial activity, they will increase their 
constituents’ welfare by more than the utility losses inflicted by whatever environmental 
degradation occurs.”). 
 117.  See id. at 604 (“The knowledge that one's competitors intend to lower or already have 
lowered environmental standards induces parties to act preemptively or responsively and to lower 
their own standards, triggering a downward regulatory spiral and nonoptimal results.”). 
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locality might be less like an experiment to determine the optimal policy 
and more like a front for the interests of the risk-creating firms.118  Of 
course, if initial expectations of some risk turn out to be too high or 
expectations of the associated benefits are too low, the jurisdiction at 
the bottom may have chosen the optimal policy. The right conclusion to 
draw from the race-to-the-bottom argument is that we have no reason 
to assume that the policy adopted by the state that wins the race-to-the-
bottom is the optimal one. 
But even if a race to the bottom does not take place and states 
and localities innovate policy by choice rather than pressure from firms, 
the Laboratory of Democracy model has a more basic flaw: 
decentralized innovation is not an “experiment” in a rigorous sense.119 
As one scholar put it, “ ‘Innovation’ might have been a better word 
choice for Justice Brandeis than ‘experimentation,’ saving us all a lot of 
bother.”120 
The information federal regulators can glean from these 
innovations will be far less informative than what they can achieve 
through deliberate regulatory experiments. As with market innovation, 
the regulatory innovations that the Laboratory of Democracy model 
makes possible will not be randomized or even subject to weaker 
controls, so regulators hoping to learn from them will face difficulties in 
disentangling causation.121 Selection effects may cloud the results 
because which jurisdictions choose which regulatory interventions may 
be correlated with other facts about those jurisdictions that could be 
relevant to the health or environmental outcomes observed. 
The Laboratory of Democracy model also allows for interest 
group and social norm entrenchment, at least in jurisdictions that do 
not rapidly adopt precautionary regulation. Mobile risk-creating firms 
are on the fortunate side of a power asymmetry: they only need to 
prevail in one jurisdiction to continue their operations and build up a 
 
 118.  But see generally Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public 
Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001) (arguing that it is not clear whether the interest 
group power of regulated firms would be worse at the federal or state level). 
 119.  In theory, a centralized federal government could conduct experiments by randomly 
assigning certain policies to certain states or localities, but this type of experiment would deprive 
sub-federal polities of what supposedly makes federalism attractive: the ability to choose. See 
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 903, 925 (1994) (“To experiment with different approaches for achieving a single, agreed-
upon goal, one sub-unit must be assigned an option that initially seems less desirable . . . . Allowed 
to choose their own strategies, as they are in a decentralized system, no sub-units would choose 
these unappealing options . . . .”). 
 120.  Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 399 (1997). 
 121.  See infra Section III.B (explaining randomization). 
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power base before expanding to other locales, but must lose in all 
jurisdictions in order to be restrained. 
For these reasons, at best, the state and local policy innovations 
that the Laboratory of Democracy model permits are inferior to 
deliberate federal regulatory experiments. At worst, when a vicious race 
to the bottom occurs, the Laboratory of Democracy model collapses into 
the Common Law model and exhibits all of its problems. 
III. AN EXPERIMENTALIST MODEL 
Part II lodged two criticisms at the existing models for 
regulating emerging risks. First, they do not generate the information 
needed for regulation rapidly and reliably. Second, they make future 
regulation more difficult, either by cutting off innovation (the 
Precautionary model) or allowing entrenchment (the Common Law and 
Laboratory of Democracy models). 
This Part proposes an Experimentalist model for regulating 
emerging risks that addresses both of these problems. Its answer to the 
information generation problem is to empower regulatory agencies to 
organize randomized experiments with new risky technologies. Its 
answer to the entrenchment problem is to empower agencies to impose 
moratoria or other limits on the risky technologies outside of the 
experimental conditions. The effect would be to expedite the acquisition 
of reliable information while preserving all regulatory options. 
An agency would respond to emerging risks in four steps. First, 
the agency would initiate its new powers by demonstrating that a 
technological development plausibly created a significant risk to health, 
safety, or the environment. Second, the agency would, in consultation 
with affected parties, decide on conditions for randomized experiments 
with the new risky activity and possible means to regulate it. Third, the 
agency would, if necessary, impose moratoria or other temporary limits 
on the risky technology outside of the experiment to protect the 
experiment’s controls, protect the public in the interim, and prevent 
entrenchment. Fourth, the agency’s actions would be subject to judicial 
review to ensure that the risk was plausible and significant and that 
the experiments and moratoria were appropriately limited in time and 
scope. 
A. Plausibility Standard 
The philosophy of the Experimentalist model of regulation is to 
vary the power an agency is granted with the information it has 
available. It would not alter existing administrative law requiring that 
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rules must survive notice and comment rulemaking, cost-benefit 
analysis, and thorough judicial review to be permanent. But an agency 
would be granted power to implement a moratorium if it could 
demonstrate that an emerging technology plausibly created a 
significant risk to health, safety, or the environment. 
The aim of the plausibility standard is to allow agencies to act 
notwithstanding scientific uncertainty. A risk is plausible if the theory 
suggesting the potential harm is consistent with existing scientific 
evidence.122 The available evidence need not establish the likelihood of 
the risk. The plausibility standard would not require that an agency 
provide even one study showing evidence of the risk. Yet not all 
perceived risks would pass the standard. 
Consider, for example, fluoridation of the public water supply. 
Extensive research establishes that drinking water with small 
quantities of sodium fluoride added reduces tooth decay by about 25% 
over a lifetime.123 According to the CDC, “[t]he weight of the peer-
reviewed scientific evidence does not support an association between 
water fluoridation and any adverse health effect or systemic 
disorder . . . .”124 At least in some communities, however, the public 
continues to fear that fluoridation poses serious health risks. For 
example, in 2013, the electorate of Portland, Oregon voted, by a 60 
percent to 40 percent margin, to oppose fluoridation of the public water 
supply, continuing the city’s longstanding ban on the practice.125 
A purported risk from fluoridation, because it is inconsistent 
with existing scientific evidence, would fail a plausibility test. Part IV 
will argue that the risk that fracking could contaminate groundwater, 
the risk that e-cigarettes could increase tobacco consumption, and the 
risk that autonomous vehicles could increase traffic fatalities would all 
pass the plausibility test. The plausibility standard undoubtedly leads 
to borderline cases, but the basic concept—that agencies should be able 
 
 122.  Cf. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (“Asking for plausible 
grounds to infer [a factual conclusion] does not impose a probability requirement[;] . . . it simply 
calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [that 
factual conclusion].”). 
 123.  CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CMTY. WATER FLUORIDATION: 
FLUORIDATION BASICS (July 28, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/fluoridation/basics/index.htm 
[http://perma.cc/MV77-KXGN]. 
 124.  CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CMTY. WATER FLUORIDATION: HEALTH 
EFFECTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT (July 10, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/fluoridation/safety/ 
health_effects.htm [http://perma.cc/GVW3-HGQV]. 
 125.  See Ryan Kost, Portland Fluoride: For the Fourth Time Since 1956, Portland Voters 
Reject Fluoridation, OREGONIAN, May 21, 2013, http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/ 
2013/05/portland_fluoride_for_the_four.html [http://perma.cc/RTH6-4MXB]. 
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to act with evidence of only a potential risk—is critical to effective 
regulation of emerging risks. 
B. Experiment Power 
The word “experiment” is sometimes used expansively in 
political debates about emerging technologies. But, as Part II argued, 
these phrases are misleading. Market activity is not the deliberate 
product of a neutral experimenter aiming to learn about a new 
technology. It is the spontaneous, decentralized activity of firms seeking 
to profit from bringing a new technology to market. Experimental 
conditions are designed, or at least should be designed, to achieve 
accurate results, whereas it would be absurd to suggest that firms 
should be neutral about what benefits and risks their new technological 
innovations bring.  Similarly, although individual state or local 
governments may conduct experiments with new regulatory policies, 
the entire set of such policies as a whole is not centrally organized or 
subject to experimental controls.126 This lack of organization creates the 
possibility of selection effects and cautions against treating the results 
of state and local policy innovations as the results of scientific 
experiments. The Experimentalist model is different: agencies would be 
empowered to conduct non-metaphorical experiments. 
One benefit of focusing agencies on acquiring information before 
they propose a rule is to increase the likelihood that regulators will 
approach an issue with an open mind. Because agencies will not yet 
have psychologically committed to a particular regulatory solution, 
their information acquisition may be less influenced by confirmation 
bias.127 This is not to say that agencies will be completely neutral about 
future regulation. That they have initiated the new powers presumes 
that these agencies consider the risk to be plausible. But focusing 
regulators on acquiring information, rather than defending a proposed 
 
 126.  For a discussion of how the federal government can use its subdivisions and regional 
offices to direct and coordinate local-level experimentation with different regulatory approaches, 
see David Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58, 116–20 (2016). For the 
observation that the federal government is well-positioned to use federal law to encourage state-
based experimentation when states are not experimenting at optimal levels, see Abbe Gluck, 
Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in 
Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 566–68 (2011). 
 127.  The law and behavioral economics literature sometimes analyzes confirmation bias with 
the related, more general concept of self-serving biases, which cause us to interpret information so 
as to promote our self-interest. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 1051, 1093 (2000) (describing what the authors call “the ‘confirmatory’ or ‘self-serving’ bias,” 
which they define as “the term to describe the observation that actors often interpret information 
in ways that serve their interests or preconceived notions”).   
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rule, might make them more open to revising their prior actions than 
they are in maintaining the status quo. 
1. Benefits of Randomization 
The main benefit of experiments is that they would produce 
better information through randomization.128 Randomized experiments 
are “[t]he gold standard for estimating the causal impact of a 
regulation.”129 In a randomized experiment, subjects are deliberately 
assigned to treatment or control groups randomly.130 If the experiment 
is of a sufficient size, the law of large numbers ensures that the 
treatment will be the best causal explanation for any observed 
differences in outcome between the two groups.131 
In the context of a regulatory experiment, randomization 
requires that whether a participant is exposed to a risky technology (the 
treatment group) or not (the control group) be intentionally 
randomized. Regulators could choose multiple treatment groups in 
which different means of mitigating the risk are tested. The results of 
a multi-treatment experiment would give regulators a menu of different 
regulatory options to consider when they move to a cost-benefit analysis 
for permanent regulation.132 
Risk-creating firms would have an incentive to suggest potential 
means for efficiently mitigating a risk if they predicted complying with 
the rule mandating those means would be less costly than a rule that 
the agency might otherwise promulgate. An agency would not be legally 
required to test out firm-proposed ideas, but would have an incentive to 
do so because although the conditions of the experiment itself would not 
be subject to judicial review, whatever permanent rule the agency 
ultimately promulgated would be. A regulated firm could use an 
 
 128.  Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 939–46. 
 129.  Greenstone, supra note 34, at 116. 
 130.  Indeed, “[r]andom selection thus is not haphazard selection or selection by convenience—
it follows very specific rules and, in the vast majority of studies, will occur only if the researcher 
intentionally chooses to invoke it.” Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 108–09 (2002). 
 131.  Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 934–37. 
 132.  Notwithstanding the benefits of randomized regulatory experiments, regulatory agencies 
rarely use them. See id. at 931 (noting only a “handful of exceptions” to the lack of randomized 
regulatory experiments). One notable exception is the FDA, which relies heavily on randomized 
clinical trials for its regulation of pharmaceuticals. See Jennifer J. Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish 
the “Gold Standard” for New Drug Approval? Redefining “Substantial Evidence” in the FDA 
Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 127, 131 (1999) (briefly explaining the history of 
the FDA’s preference for randomized clinical trials and explaining that a “properly conducted 
[randomized clinical trial] permits an accurate, objective, and scientific assessment of whether a 
treatment works—and if so, how effective it is”).   
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agency’s failure to test out the firm’s proposed risk-mitigating measure 
to challenge the analysis underlying the permanent rule. 
2. Practical Challenges to Randomized Experiments 
There are real challenges in implementing randomized 
experiments in natural environments, even when the experimental 
subjects are cooperating. These challenges include: attrition133—
subjects might quit the experiment; crossover134—subjects might switch 
from one group to another; and spillover135—subjects in one group 
might be affected by treatments applied to another group. But all of 
these challenges can be overcome. Attrition can be managed through a 
large sample size and by randomly pre-pairing each subject with 
subjects from other groups, so that the pair as a whole can be cut out of 
the experiment if one member quits.136 Crossover and spillover effects 
can be more difficult to police, but carefully monitoring the experiment 
while it is ongoing and limiting the risky technology outside of the 
experiment with the moratorium power will help. 
Another worry is that, in some instances, a treatment may affect 
individual subjects differently enough that information about 
population effects is not useful for future rulemaking. Some have 
argued, for example, that, as genomics research leads to more 
personalized medicine, the FDA’s insistence on randomized trials 
designed to observe net effects on a large population has become 
misguided.137 One can imagine analogues of this argument in other risk 
regulation contexts in which exposure to a risk has heterogeneous 
effects. But this is really an argument against drawing all-or-nothing 
policy conclusions from randomized experiments rather than an 
argument against conducting them. In fact, regulated firms can and 
should use evidence from randomized experiments to argue that, even 
if some risk should be banned for the overall population, it should be 
permitted for some narrow subpopulation or under some specialized 
conditions where the experiment suggests atypical results.138 
 
 133.  Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 957–59. 
 134.  Id. at 959–60. 
 135.  Id. at 960. 
 136.  Id. at 958–59. 
 137.  See PETER W. HUBER, THE CURE IN THE CODE 103–12 (2013) (criticizing “The Fading 
Myth of the FDA’s ‘Gold Standard’ ”). 
 138.  Firms do so after FDA clinical trials, although in some cases this can create the problem 
of “data dredging”—scouring statistical data for some subgroup that could technically be argued 
to have a benefit, even if that benefit is just an artifact of the data. See generally Anup Malani et 
al., Accounting for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in the FDA Approval Process, 67 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 23 (2012) (explaining and proposing a solution to the data dredging problem). 
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A more powerful objection to this way of implementing 
regulatory experiments is that scientific practice generally counsels 
against relying too much on the results of one experiment, even if it is 
a randomized one. Yet allowing time for replication would undermine 
many of the benefits of temporary regulation. There is an inevitable 
tradeoff between allowing time for experiment replication and quickly 
implementing the regulation that early experimental results support.139 
One carefully controlled, large group size, federal regulatory 
experiment will likely be more useful than uncontrolled market 
innovation or state and local policy innovation. Moreover, although the 
length of experiments and moratoria would be subject to judicial review, 
courts would not be precluded from allowing an agency to conduct an 
additional experiment or extend a moratorium if early results proved 
inconclusive. 
3. Ethical Challenges to Randomized Experiments 
Some randomized regulatory experiments have been criticized 
on ethical grounds. For example, consider randomized experiments on 
the effectiveness of social welfare programs.140 Assigning someone to a 
control group means denying someone a benefit, which is effectively 
making that individual worse off so that society might gain policy 
knowledge. To some extent, this worry is a product of framing effects. 
It appears less objectionable to conduct a random experiment with a 
previously unavailable social benefit than to experiment with a benefit 
to which some individuals are entitled under existing law. But in either 
case, the experimenter has a partial response.  If the benefit does not 
achieve the desired result, no harm is done.  If the benefit does achieve 
the result, the prospects of the benefit program persisting over the long 
run improve, thereby serving the long-term interests of the individuals 
from whom the benefit is temporarily withheld. This is, however, only 
a partial response. There is still a potential short-term harm done to 
the subjects denied a benefit, and that must be factored into the overall 
normative evaluation of whether the experiment is worthwhile. 
 
 139.  Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1437 (2011) (“The agent's marginal research benefit from investing an 
additional unit of effort in research is simply the difference between the research payoff and the 
default payoff. Thus, the strength of the agent's research incentive is a decreasing function of her 
default payoff and an increasing function of her research payoff.”).   
 140.  This is not a hypothetical scenario. Abramowicz and collaborators explain that most 
randomized policy “experiments have been in the area of social services, testing whether 
expenditures on entitlements succeed in achieving social goals, such as reducing poverty.” 
Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 932; see also id. at 932–33 (listing examples). 
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In clinical trials, the answer is informed consent: patients will 
generally only enter experiments with new drugs if their medical 
condition is dire enough to take the risk. But even in clinical trials, the 
tradeoff re-emerges as the experimenters begin to observe differences 
between the control group and the treatment group and do not 
immediately relay that knowledge to the subjects. So in clinical trials, 
as in social benefit experiments, it is often imperative to end 
experiments early when enough evidence has accumulated that the 
interests of the subjects in the less fortunate group outweigh the 
marginal benefits of increased confidence in the results.141 
These considerations—short-term harm, informed consent, and 
early termination—should be incorporated into regulatory 
experiments. Regulators should acknowledge that subjects in an 
experiment will be exposed to a risk over the short-term and consider 
whether the experiment is still warranted or whether the technology 
simply ought to be banned outright. Whether those risks can be 
voluntarily accepted through informed consent will often be critical to 
the decision. Regulators will sometimes face a difficult tradeoff between 
ending an experiment early and entering into rulemaking with less 
confidence versus letting the experiment continue and maintaining risk 
exposure or limits on a seemingly innocuous technology. But those 
decisions are difficult only because randomized experiments can 
produce socially useful knowledge. 
C. Moratorium Power 
A moratorium on a new risky technology would serve two aims: 
protecting the reliability of experimental conditions and preventing 
entrenchment. For many emerging risks, an agency might be able to 
achieve these goals with restrictions short of a total moratorium on the 
technology outside of the experimental conditions. All things being 
equal, agencies should choose the least restrictive means consistent 
with those goals.142 Yet total moratoria will sometimes be necessary and 
can be justified. 
 
 141.  See Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 973 (“[I]t is standard protocol to shut down 
medical trials early if it becomes clear that either the control or treatment therapy is superior.”). 
 142.  This prescription does not entail that the decision about means should be subject to 
judicial review. Determining what the least restrictive means to protect experiments and prevent 
entrenchment are may require a judgment call in the face of scientific uncertainty. 
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1. Protecting Experimental Conditions 
For a randomized experiment to work, a sufficient number of the 
initial subjects need to remain in their assigned treatment or control 
group until the end of the experiment.143 For at least some types of risks, 
permitting the risky technology outside of the experiment will increase 
the chance of interference with the experiment. There could be 
crossover effects because subjects in the control group participated in 
the risky activity outside of the experiment or subjects in a risk-
mitigation treatment group participated in the risky activity without 
the benefit of the risk-mitigating measure. Imagine a pharmaceutical 
trial in which a subject in a control group consumes a drug with similar 
properties outside of the experiment. There could also be spillover 
effects because subjects in a control group were exposed to the risky 
technology because of its presence outside of the experimental 
conditions. Imposing a moratorium on the technology outside of the 
experiment is the simplest way to solve these problems. 
2. Preventing Entrenchment 
The moratorium power would allow agencies to preserve a broad 
set of regulatory options.144 The most straightforward justification for 
preserving options is to prevent interest groups from blocking them. If 
a regulation is otherwise justified, the political reality that well-
financed, well-organized firms possess interest group power is not a 
good reason to oppose the regulation. Rather, it is a good reason to 
prevent that political reality from developing in the first instance. 
Two important predictors of interest group power are wealth and 
organization. A moratorium can temporarily prevent risk-creating 
firms from acquiring both. The moratorium limits the growth and 
profits of risk-creating firms. This can be a direct effect of restricting 
the risky technology to sites or subjects randomly selected to participate 
in the experiment. It can also be an indirect result of the signal that the 
moratorium sends to investors: regulators are serious about reducing 
 
 143.  See Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 957 (explaining that attrition is a problem in part 
because it reduces sample size). 
 144.  The basic idea that risk regulation policy should be concerned with preserving future 
options is familiar, but scholars have not generally emphasized preserving political options. See, 
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 896 (2006) 
(concluding that real option theory suggests that “those who make environmental policy, should 
find it worthwhile to invest resources to preserve flexibility for the future”). See generally Michael 
A. Livermore, Patience Is An Economic Virtue: Real Options, Natural Resources, and Offshore Oil, 
84 U. COLO. L. REV. 581 (2013) (applying real-option theory to nonrenewable resource extraction). 
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this risk and, depending on the results of the experiment, the risky 
technology might be limited, or even prohibited, permanently. 
Investors might still decide to bet on the risk-creating firms 
nonetheless, because they expect that the experimental results will be 
favorable for the firms and lead to less restrictive regulation. In that 
case, the firms might still be able to grow during the course of the 
experiment. But that is not a bad outcome. To the extent that investors 
base their decisions on private information that the relevant risk is not 
as bad as feared or can be inexpensively mitigated, they are relying on 
information that indicates that stricter regulation might not be justified 
and that interest group entrenchment will not be problematic. The 
critical point is that, because of the moratorium, investors will be 
betting on facts about the risk and its potential for cost-effective 
mitigation, rather than on the risk-creating firm’s likelihood of evading 
justified regulation through interest group power. 
A moratorium will also limit risk-creating firms’ ability to 
organize for similar reasons. A fledgling industry with small start-ups 
facing regulatory uncertainty will less rapidly form a trade association 
with sophisticated lobbyists. To the extent that the experiment tests out 
risk-mitigating measures that might benefit some firms more than 
others, the experiment and moratorium period might even pit some of 
the risk-creating firms against each other. 
In the narrower set of cases where there is a justification for 
preventing social norm entrenchment, a moratorium could also achieve 
that aim. By restricting the use of the new technology to experimental 
conditions, social norms might not crystallize around its use. How that 
dynamic would work would depend on the specific social facts 
surrounding the particular technology. Part IV explores this possibility 
for the particular technologies it analyzes in greater detail. 
3. Moratoria and Capture 
One might object to granting agencies a moratorium power on 
the basis that the power itself could become a tool of interest groups. 
Interest group theory predicts that incumbent firms in an industry will 
seek to capture regulatory agencies to impose barriers to entry into 
their market.145 It is conceivable that, in a captured agency, the 
moratorium power could be used to impose temporary restrictions on a 
new technology as a means to stifle potential competition to the 
incumbent firms. 
 
 145.  See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 3, 5 (1971). 
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The problem with this objection is that incumbent firms have a 
countervailing incentive to oppose regulation that would limit the 
future size of their market, particularly if they could consolidate the 
expanded market by acquiring new entrants. Consider e-cigarettes: the 
major tobacco firms could have responded to the rise of start-ups selling 
e-cigarettes by seeking regulation to ban the technology. For a brief 
political moment, that might have been possible. But the tobacco firms 
eventually realized that e-cigarettes could expand their customer base 
and either started their own lines of e-cigarettes or acquired the new 
entrants.146 Banning e-cigarettes would have foreclosed what the 
tobacco firms came to view as a profit opportunity. Of course, this 
market consolidation occurred in a world without a moratorium power. 
One cannot know how it would have played out in a counterfactual 
world in which agencies had such power available. But the same 
economic incentive favoring expanding markets would hold. 
The moratorium power’s capacity to prevent interest group 
entrenchment is strongest when an agency can act while there is 
neither a united industry coalition opposing regulation nor one aiming 
to capture an agency to impose regulation. That moment is possible 
when agencies first become aware of an emerging risk, or so Part IV 
will argue. 
4. Alternatives to Moratoria 
Agencies could also choose to impose other limits on the risky 
technology short of a moratorium. If it did not interfere with 
experimental conditions, they could permit firms to continue working 
with the risky technology within certain limits of time, space, or 
intensity or while employing a particular risk-mitigating measure. 
With some risks, an agency might simply forbid sale or marketing of 
the risky product to consumers, or to some especially vulnerable subset 
of consumers. Agencies could also make permission to continue working 
with the risky technology contingent on the firm allowing more 
intrusive observation, so that use of the technology would be easy to 
halt if the experimental results suggested the risk warranted it. The 
optimal set of limitations will vary by risk. Restrictions short of a total 
moratorium might, in some cases, protect the experiment and prevent 
entrenchment. 
 
 146.  For more on the consolidation of the e-cigarette market, see infra Section IV.B. 
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D. Circumscribed Judicial Review 
There are good reasons not to shield all agency decisions with 
experiment and moratorium powers from judicial review. Most of the 
traditional arguments for judicial review of agency action—statutory 
compliance, congressional monitoring, the threat of capture, and 
quality control—would still apply.147 In addition, the new powers would 
give regulatory agencies more authority to impose burdens on risk-
creating firms than they currently possess. The special features of 
emerging risks—the factual uncertainty they present and the short 
political window for action they allow—justify those new powers. But 
agencies may be tempted to use them as an end run around the sluggish 
rulemaking process.148 Protecting the powers from judicial review 
would exacerbate the temptation to use them as a de facto regulatory 
tool. 
But some agency decisions in implementing experiments and 
moratoria do merit protection. With emerging risks, agencies will lack 
rigorous evidence establishing the likelihood or magnitude of harm that 
the source of risk could create. Agencies will sometimes also need to test 
multiple means of mitigating those risks. An agency’s decision about 
which means to test will involve considerable discretion, and, given the 
lack of basic information about the risk, will be difficult to justify 
conclusively. Judicial review of these issues—facts about the risk and 
choices about which regulatory means to test—would constrain the 
flexibility that the new powers were intended to provide. 
1. Judicial Review of the Experiment and Moratorium Powers 
Judicial review of agency experiments and moratoria should be 
limited to the perimeter: decisions about when a moratorium should 
start, when it should end, and what its scope should be—that is, what 
risks are covered—while it is ongoing. Details internal to how the 
experiments should be conducted and the ideal content of the 
moratorium should be shielded. 
The plausibility standard should be subject to judicial review. It 
is intended to screen out theories of risk inconsistent with the best 
 
 147.  See supra Section I.A.3. 
 148.  An early empirical study “speculated . . . that reviewing courts’ imposition of 
adjudicatory-type procedural and evidentiary burdens on rulemaking during [the period of the 
study] may have had the perverse effect of discouraging its use.” Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald 
Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 984, 1057 (1990). If this speculation is correct, providing agencies with new powers more 
flexible than rulemaking might tempt agencies to substitute use of those powers for rulemaking. 
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available scientific evidence. The plausibility standard has the effect of 
a weak regulatory priority-setting device:149 if an agency seeks to 
initiate an experiment and a moratorium for a risk that does not 
plausibly create a significant harm to health, safety, or the 
environment, it will be a red flag that the agency’s priorities were 
misplaced. It might even be evidence of agency capture. The courts 
should not be setting agencies’ priorities for them. But the minimum 
threshold of the plausibility standard can serve as a check on 
egregiously misplaced priorities. 
Federal courts are, of course, familiar with making plausibility 
determinations from their experience with motions to dismiss.150 Once 
the agency satisfied the plausibility standard, it need not provide any 
more evidence of the risk being regulated until it ultimately 
promulgated a rule to regulate it. 
Judicial review should also ensure that an agency’s experiment 
and moratorium are limited in time and scope. How long a moratorium 
should last could be a difficult question, and courts should give some 
deference to agency judgments. But agencies must be subject to judicial 
review on their decisions about the length of moratoria to prevent them 
from using moratoria as de facto regulation. Agencies’ good faith 
experimental goals should be the decisive factor in setting the length of 
a moratorium. 
The scope of the risk should also receive judicial scrutiny. A risk 
like “e-cigarettes” is neatly defined. A risk like “biotechnology” would 
be too amorphous. A risk like “nanotechnology” would present a more 
complicated question. One can define “nanotechnology” as any 
technology at nanoscale.151 But that definition is broad enough to 
encompass technologies for a myriad of industrial and consumer uses 
that could create a broad range of safety risks.152 Courts should 
probably permit experiments and moratoria for nanotechnology, but the 
closeness of this issue suggests that some line-drawing problems will be 
inevitable. 
As with any area of repeated judicial review, courts can self-
calibrate through the development of precedent. Issues such as what 
makes a risk “plausible,” how long a moratorium should last, and what 
 
 149.  See John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure 
in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277, 311–13 (1992) (proposing a “de minimis risk” 
standard as a tool for agency priority-setting in toxic risk regulation). 
 150.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The leading cases on the 12(b)(6) plausibility standard are Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 151.  For a similar definition, see Mandel, supra note 13, at 1328 (defining nanotechnology as 
pertaining to “a variety of activities that involve manipulating matter at an atomic scale”). 
 152.  Id. at 1340–45. 
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kind of definition should limit the scope of a “risk”—or at least what 
range of discretion agencies should have over those questions—will 
gradually resolve themselves through precedent. 
2. Judicial Review of Subsequent Rules 
The division between issues subject to and protected from 
judicial review discussed above applies only to agency action during and 
about the experiments and moratoria. At the end of the experimental 
period, if the agency sought to promulgate a permanent rule, it would 
need to proceed through a conventional rulemaking. That rulemaking 
would then be subject to judicial review, just like any other agency 
action. 
Agencies should have discretion to retain the moratoria or other 
limits during the rulemaking that follows an experiment. If agencies 
lacked that discretion, then each time an agency adopted a strict 
moratorium and experiments demonstrated that the risk justified a 
permanent ban, the agency would be compelled to relax the restrictions 
as it crafted the permanent rule, immediately after acquiring evidence 
that the restrictions were justified. 
Administrative law has confronted a similar problem before. 
Until 1993, courts that held rules to be “arbitrary and capricious” would 
generally vacate the rules when they remanded them to the agencies.153 
But in Allied-Signal v. NRC, the D.C. Circuit recognized that “the 
consequences of vacating may be quite disruptive” and remanded a rule 
without vacatur.154 Likewise, the consequences of lifting a moratorium 
during a rulemaking designed to convert that moratorium into a 
permanent rule justify giving agencies a brief extension so that they 
have time to carry a proposed rule through the rulemaking process. 
The shadow of a judicial challenge to a post-experiment 
rulemaking would create incentives for agencies and regulated firms 
during the experiment.155 The results of the regulatory experiment 
would effectively create presumptions for the subsequent rulemaking. 
If the expected risk were not observed, agencies would be hard pressed 
to justify continued regulation. If a particular means to mitigate the 
risk worked, the agency would likely conduct a cost-benefit analysis for 
 
 153.  Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 
75 (1995). 
 154.  Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 151 (D.C. Cir. 
1993). 
 155.  The metaphor of parties’ bargaining in the “shadow of the law” as result of judicially 
created incentives started with Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 997 (1979).  
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adopting it. Failure to do so would leave the agency especially 
vulnerable to judicial challenge from firms who would have preferred 
some other means of mitigating the risk. 
The net effect of circumscribed judicial review for the 
experiment moratorium—and conventional judicial review for 
whatever rule the agency adopts following it—would be to give agencies 
broad discretion to experiment with different regulatory options, but 
compel them to make the resulting regulation empirically informed. 
IV. APPLICATIONS 
This Part applies the Experimentalist model to the regulation of 
three emerging risks: fracking, e-cigarettes, and autonomous vehicles. 
With fracking and e-cigarettes, regulators still lack answers to basic 
questions that would be critical to sensible regulation. While the 
information deficit surrounding autonomous vehicles cannot be reduced 
to a set of specific questions, there is still massive uncertainty about the 
effects these vehicles would have on safety and thus a strong case for 
controlled testing. 
Each of these emerging risks also raises an entrenchment 
problem. Unfortunately, for both fracking and e-cigarettes, interest 
groups may already be entrenched, but there was some point in the past 
decade in which that entrenchment could have been halted. For e-
cigarettes, we may have missed the window for preventing social norm 
entrenchment as well. With autonomous vehicles, the main worry is 
reverse social norm entrenchment, and that window may soon elapse. 
But even if our ability to prevent entrenchment of these particular risks 
has declined, the plausibility of having done so at some point suggests 
the importance of moratoria for future emerging risks. 
A. Fracking 
In the past several years, the deployment of new techniques to 
extract previously unreachable oil and gas has transformed the energy 
sector. The United States has passed Russia as the world’s largest 
producer of natural gas, and is also predicted to pass Saudi Arabia as 
the largest producer of oil by the end of the decade.156 The leading cause 
of the boom is hydraulic fracturing, or fracking—creating fractures in 
 
 156.  Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic 
Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 147 (2013). 
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layers of shale and tight rock with pressurized liquid to release oil and 
gas.157 
Fracking has been in commercial use since 1949, but it was only 
in the 2000s that the practice became widespread.158 The recent rise of 
fracking is in part due to another technique, horizontal drilling, in 
which vertical drills are extended sideways once they reach the desired 
layer, so as to maximize contact with the rock containing oil or gas.159 
These techniques have been enormously profitable for the gas and oil 
industries, but they have also raised questions about risks to health, 
safety, and the environment. 
1. Risks and Benefits 
Some of the risks fracking creates are familiar from other 
industrial activities. Fracking operations emit conventional air 
pollutants: methane, volatile organic compounds, and so-called 
naturally occurring radioactive materials.160 Fracking also consumes 
massive quantities of water.161 When fracking wastewater is disposed 
of, the force can induce earthquakes; the earthquake risk is not new to 
fracking, but it has nonetheless received significant recent attention.162 
One risk fracking might create that is genuinely new—and 
possibly merits new regulation—is the risk of groundwater 
contamination.163 The main potential contaminant is the fracking fluid 
itself; there are several plausible ways in which the chemicals in 
fracking fluid could get into groundwater.164 It is also possible that 
fracking could contaminate the groundwater in other ways by releasing 
methane, by disturbing sludge already present in wells, or through the 
disposal of fracking waste.165 Only a small number of limited studies 
have attempted to assess the risks of fracking fluid contaminating 
 
 157.  For a concise but detailed explanation of how fracking works, see Hannah Wiseman, 
Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to 
Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 117–21 (2009). 
 158.  For an account of the history, see id. at 121–27. 
 159.  Merrill & Schizer, supra note 156, at 153–54; see also Wiseman, supra note157, at 120 
(explaining how horizontal drilling fits into fracking). 
 160.  Merrill & Schizer, supra note 156, at 172–75. 
 161.  See id. at 177–79 (“EPA estimates that fracturing will consume as much water as 5 
million people if 35,000 wells are fractured each year.”). 
 162.  See id. at 179–80 (detailing earthquake risks in different stages of fracturing and state 
regulatory response). 
 163.  Id. at 180. 
 164.  Id. at 180–81. 
 165.  Id. at 192–96. 
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groundwater.166 A recent review of the evidence concluded that “[t]he 
magnitude of all these risks is uncertain and highly contested.”167 
The EPA conducted an investigation of fracking’s effects on 
groundwater contamination in Pavillion, Wyoming and released a draft 
report in 2011, which concluded that “the explanation best fitting the 
data for the deep monitoring wells is that constituents associated with 
hydraulic fracturing have been released into the [local] drinking water 
aquifer at depths above the current production zone.”168 But, after 
intense criticism of the draft report, the EPA turned over the 
investigation to the Wyoming state government, and the research was 
funded in part by Encana Oil and Gas, the firm responsible for the 
fracking operation that may have contaminated the water.169 The final 
report, released in 2015, concluded that “it is unlikely that hydraulic 
fracturing fluids have risen to shallower depths intercepted by water-
supply wells,” although it noted the possibility that preexisting gas 
wells could have served as a conduit for some contamination.170 
According to its proponents, the economic benefits of fracking 
and the associated oil and gas boom have been dramatic. IHS, a leading 
energy analysis firm funded by the industry, has estimated that 
unconventional oil and gas operations contributed $283 billion to the 
gross domestic product and employed 2.1 million workers in 2012.171 
Fracking also reduces energy prices for US consumers. IHS has 
predicted that “[b]etween 2012 and 2015, the gain in average annual 
disposable household income [will be] $926 per year as a result of the 
lower natural gas prices brought about by” unconventional natural 
 
 166.  See id. at 187–91 (detailing six studies); see also Garth T. Llewellyn, Evaluating a 
Groundwater Supply Contamination Incident Attributed to Marcellus Shale Gas Development, 112 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6325 (2015). 
 167.  Id. at 187. 
 168.  Draft Investigation of Ground Water Contamination near Pavillion, Wyoming, EPA, 33 
(2011), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/EPA_ReportOnPavillion_Dec-8-
2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6KJ-TUJD]. 
 169.  Abraham Lustgarten, EPA’s Abandoned Wyoming Fracking Study One Retreat of Many, 
PROPUBLICA (July 3, 2013, 11:58 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/epas-abandoned-
wyoming-fracking-study-one-retreat-of-many [http://perma.cc/25PC-4STP]. 
 170.  WYO. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, PAVILLION, WYOMING AREA DOMESTIC WATER WELLS 




 171.  America’s New Energy Future: The Unconventional Oil and Gas Revolution and the US 
Economy, Volume 3: A Manufacturing Renaissance, IHS 41 (2013), http://www.energyxxi.org/ 
sites/default/files/pdf/Americas_New_Energy_Future_Phase3.pdf [http://perma.cc/YV6T-A8M5]. 
Merrill and Schizer take IHS data at face value. Merrill & Schizer, supra note 156, at 148 n.3. 
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gas.172 Finally, the increase in production is also changing the balance 
of trade.173 The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) predicts 
that, due in part to continued growth in shale gas production resulting 
from “the dual application of horizontal drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing,” the United States will become a net exporter of natural gas 
in 2017.174 
Some critics have questioned how long the boom in 
unconventional oil and gas will last, even if regulation does not limit 
it.175 In parts of Wyoming, the early natural gas boom has already 
faded, and “getting drilling companies who claim to be on the verge of 
collapse to take responsibility for wells they still technically own has 
proved difficult.”176 An assessment of the costs and benefits of fracking 
should include the economic and social costs of a potential bust as much 
as the benefits of the current boom.177 
The most important effect of fracking is its impact on climate 
change. Natural gas is less carbon-intensive than coal. Natural gas 
emits 117 lbs. of CO2 per million Btu of energy while coal emits between 
214 and 229 lbs.178 Therefore, replacing coal-fired power with gas-fired 
power will result in lower carbon emissions.179 Those reductions already 
 
 172.  The Economic and Employment Contributions of Shale Gas in the United States, IHS 26 
(2011), http://energyindepth.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Shale-Gas-Economic-Impact-Dec-
2011_EMB1.pdf [http://perma.cc/X6HF-SYEK]. 
 173.  I do not mean to imply that a more favorable balance of trade for the United States is 
obviously desirable. If one evaluates domestic risk regulation policy from a cosmopolitan 
perspective, it might not be. 
 174.  Annual Energy Outlook 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. E-11 (Apr. 2015), 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2015).pdf [http://perma.cc/6W9N-763R]. 
 175.  See, e.g., Asjylyn Loder, U.S. Shale-Oil Boom May Not Last as Fracking Wells Lack 
Staying Power, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
articles/2013-10-10/u-dot-s-dot-shale-oil-boom-may-not-last-as-fracking-wells-lack-staying-power 
[http://perma.cc/574Q-DJUY]. 
 176.  Dan Frosch, Wyoming May Act to Plug Abandoned Wells as Natural Gas Boom Ends, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/25/us/state-may-act-to-plug-
abandoned-wyoming-wells-as-natural-gas-boom-ends.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/95RF-8JBE]. 
 177.  For an assessment of the economic and social costs of fracking, see, for example, Susan 
Christopherson & Ned Rightor, The Boom-Bust Cycle of Shale Gas Extraction Economies, CARDI 
REP. (Cornell Univ. Cmty. & Reg’l Dev. Inst., Ithica, N.Y.), Sep. 2011, at 4, 4–6, 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/member_files/125/20110915/index.pdf, [http://perma.cc/KNK3-2G8K]; 
Jaffrey Jacquet, Energy Boomtowns & Natural Gas: Implications for Marcellus Shale Local 
Governments & Rural Communities, 13–23, 24 (Ne. Reg’l Ctr. for Rural Dev., Paper No. 43, 2009). 
 178.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., HOW MUCH CARBON DIOXIDE IS PRODUCED WHEN DIFFERENT 
FUELS ARE BURNED?, http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=73&t=11 (last updated June 18, 
2015) [http://perma.cc/ZLS6-E4GF]. 
 179.  Some authorities contest the claim that fracking will necessarily result in climate 
benefits, given certain unknowns about the risk of methane leakage during the process of 
gathering natural gas from production sites. One peer-reviewed study found higher rates of 
methane emissions at fracking sites compared to conventional natural gas wells, largely attributed 
to “venting of methane at the time that wells are completed.” Robert W. Howarth, A Bridge to 
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have begun over the past few years. According to the most recent data 
from the EIA, “[t]he natural gas share of electricity generation grew 
from approximately 11% in 1990 . . . to 26% in 2014,” which “has 
contributed to the decline in carbon intensity of the energy mix since 
2008.”180 
Some environmental policy experts view the transition from coal 
to natural gas caused by fracking as a salutary development.  In 2011, 
a panel chaired by Ernest Moniz—then the U.S. Secretary of Energy—
issued a report stating that “a combination of demand reduction and 
displacement of coal-fired power by gas-fired generation is the lowest-
cost way to reduce CO2 emissions by up to 50%.”181 The report concedes 
that “[f]or more stringent CO2 emissions reductions, further de-
carbonization of the energy sector will be required,” but concludes that 
“natural gas provides a cost-effective bridge to such a low-carbon 
future.”182 
Some environmentalists nonetheless oppose fracking. For 
example, Bill McKibben, a leader in the environmental movement, 
admits that “if we could convert our coal-fired power plants to natural 
gas . . . carbon emissions would drop.”183 But he worries that natural 
gas will “crowd out truly low-carbon sources of power: abundant and 
cheap natural gas would make it that much harder to get sun and wind 
(or, if it’s your cup of hot water, nuclear power) up and running on a 
large scale.”184 One could add to McKibben’s economic argument the 
possibility of interest group entrenchment. Once the nation becomes so 
heavily invested in natural gas, energy firms might be able to thwart 
regulation that would require a transition to renewable energy. 
 
Nowhere: Methane Emissions and the Greenhouse Gas Footprint of Natural Gas, 2 ENERGY SCI. & 
ENG’G 47, 49 (2014). But see A.R. Brandt et al., Methane Leaks from North American Natural Gas 
Systems, 343 SCIENCE 733, 733 (2014) (“[A]ssessments using 100-year impact indicators show 
system-wide leakage is unlikely to be large enough to negate climate benefits of coal-to-[natural 
gas] substitution.”). 
 180.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. ENERGY-RELATED CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS, 2014 
(Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/carbon [http://perma.cc/T36H-WT8Z]. 
 181.  ERNEST MONIZ ET AL., THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY 
2 (2011), http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/NaturalGas_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/GY4N-JQ8A]. 
 182.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 183.  Bill McKibben, Why Not Frack?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Mar. 8, 2012), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/mar/08/why-not-frack/ [http://perma.cc/9ZPB-
AC6Q]. 
 184.  Id. The International Energy Agency has echoed this concern. See INTERNATIONAL 
ENERGY AGENCY, GOLDEN RULES FOR A GOLDEN AGE OF GAS 80 (Nov. 12, 2012), 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2012/goldenrules/weo2012_goldenrulesrep
ort.pdf [http://perma.cc/5MXJ-4RQS] (“Depending on the type of policies in place, an abundance of 
natural gas might diminish the resolve of governments to support low and zero-carbon sources of 
energy.”) 
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But until renewable energy becomes more efficient and a 
political consensus is formed around aggressive climate regulation, the 
comparative improvement that natural gas offers over coal may be the 
bridge, as Moniz argues. It is at least reasonable to believe that, if 
fracking can be done in a way that does not create other countervailing 
health or environmental risks, its climate and economic benefits might 
justify its costs. The problem now is that we do not know enough about 
these potentially countervailing risks. 
2. Existing Regulation 
Interest group entrenchment has influenced the lax federal 
regulation of fracking, though some federal environmental statutes do 
apply to the practice. For example, the New Source Performance 
Standards contained in the Clean Air Act (“CAA”),185 which controls 
certain types of emissions, apply to fracking operations. The EPA has 
promulgated a regulation putting those requirements into effect for new 
oil and gas operations in 2012.186 
But fracking is mostly exempt from federal environmental 
statutes.187 In some statutes, fracking is exempted simply because all 
oil and gas operations are exempted.188 The most critical exemptions for 
fracking in federal environmental statutes, however, were added in the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005.189 That legislation amended the Safe Water 
Drinking Act (“SWDA”) to exclude fracking from permitting 
requirements designed to protect the water in injection wells, unless 
the fracking uses diesel fuel.190 It also amended the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”)—which, it is important to note, mostly regulates surface water 
rather than groundwater—to expand the exemption for stormwater 
 
 185.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (2012). 
 186.  Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63). 
 187.  See Merrill & Schizer, supra note 156, at 200 (“Given the traditional primacy of states in 
oil and gas regulation, federal law has little to say about fracturing. Indeed, key environmental 
statutes exempt the practice.”). For a more detailed summary of the relevant federal law, see 
generally ADAM VANN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43152, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: 
SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES (2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43152.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/HA4E-8HXU]. 
 188.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A) (2012) (exemption in the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2012) (exemption in the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act). 
 189.  Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). 
 190.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (excluding “the underground injection of fluids or 
propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations related to 
oil, gas, or geothermal production activities” from the definition of “[u]nderground injection”). 
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runoff from oil and gas operations, including fracking, provided the 
stormwater did not come into contact with the wastewater.191 
Wastewater remains regulated with a permitting regime under the 
CWA.192 
Only recently have federal regulators begun to tackle the 
groundwater contamination issue. In 2009, in a report attached to an 
appropriations bill, Congress “urge[d] EPA to review the risks that 
hydraulic fracturing poses to drinking water supplies, using the best 
available science, as well as independent sources of information.”193 In 
the aftermath of the Pavillion study, the EPA undertook a more 
comprehensive study of the groundwater contamination risk.194 It 
issued a draft assessment in 2015, in which the EPA concludes that 
“there are above and below ground mechanisms by which hydraulic 
fracturing activities have the potential to impact drinking water 
resources.”195 The assessment “did not find evidence that these 
mechanisms have led to widespread, systemic impacts on drinking 
water resources in the United States,” but did find “specific instances 
where one or more mechanisms led to impacts on drinking water 
resources, including contamination of drinking water wells.”196 The 
number of instances “was small compared to the number of 
hydraulically fractured wells,” but that may have been a result of the 
limited availability of data.197 
Federal regulation may also soon require that firms disclose the 
chemicals they use in fracking. In 2015, the Department of the Interior 
published a final rule that would require oil and gas companies to 
“public[ly] disclos[e] the chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing” on 
 
 191.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2) (2012) (“The Administrator shall not require a permit under 
this section . . . for discharges of stormwater runoff from mining operations or oil and gas 
exploration . . . which . . . do not come into contact with[ ] any overburden, raw material, 
intermediate products, finished product, byproduct, or waste products located on the site of such 
operations.”). 
 192.  For a brief discussion of this issue, see Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in 
Fracking Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729, 774 (2013). 
 193.  H.R. REP. No. 111-180, at 100 (2009). 
 194.  See generally EPA’s Study of Hydraulic Fracturing for Oil and Gas and Its Potential 
Impact on Drinking Water Resources, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/hfstudy (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2015) [http://perma.cc/R4B8-BHCJ]. 
 195.  ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES (2015), 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/hf_es_erd_jun2015.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/2LU6-HBDU]. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. 
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federal and tribal lands.198 However, industry groups challenged the 
regulations in court, and in September 2015 a Wyoming federal judge 
granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the rule 
pending the outcome of the case.199 In discussing the agency’s likelihood 
of success on the merits, the court stressed the absence of “a single 
confirmed case of the hydraulic fracturing process contaminating 
groundwater.”200 The court agreed that the agency “need not wait for ‘a 
catastrophe’ to take action,” but ruled that “there must be substantial 
evidence to support the existence of a risk” for the agency’s action to 
satisfy the APA’s arbitrary and capricious requirement.201 
Further, the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”) generally 
requires firms to maintain a record of certain chemicals used in 
manufacturing or processing.202 In 2014, the EPA published advanced 
notice of a proposed rule that would “develop an approach to obtain 
information on chemical substances and mixtures used in hydraulic 
fracturing.”203 
In the absence of tighter federal regulation, fracking has become 
a test case for the Laboratory of Democracy model. In some ways, the 
light federal regulation of fracking is consistent with the historical 
distribution of policy authority in our federal system. The “regulation 
of oil and natural gas exploration and production in the United States 
has always been primarily a state matter.”204 Likewise, “regulation of 
groundwater contamination has traditionally been left to the states.”205 
State responses have varied from strongly precautionary to 
effectively Common Law. A complete survey of existing state and local 
regulations would require a separate article.206 But it is worth noting 
the diversity of such policies. Vermont has enacted a permanent 
statutory ban, which flatly states: “No person may engage in hydraulic 
 
 198.  Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,128, 
16,128 (March 26, 2015) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160). 
 199.  Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 15-CV-043, 2015 WL 5845145 (D. Wyo. Sep. 
30, 2015) (granting preliminary injunction).  
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  15 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (2012). 
 203.  Hydraulic Fracturing Chemicals and Mixtures, 79 Fed. Reg. 28,664 (proposed May 19, 
2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I). 
 204.  David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy 
Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 447 (2013). 
 205.  Id. at 490. 
 206.  For a good summary of existing state regulations, with an emphasis on enforcement 
patterns, see generally Hannah Wiseman, Fracking Regulation Applied, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 361 (2012). 
        
2016] REGULATION OF EMERGING RISKS 451 
fracturing in the State.”207 New York has enacted a ban through the 
state’s Department of Environmental Conservation, which denies all 
applications for fracking permits.208 In Pennsylvania, fracking is 
permitted, but the state’s Department of Environmental Protection 
regulates it.209 In many states, though, the primary regulator is the 
state oil and gas commission.210 
3. Prescriptions 
Fracking is—or was—a strong candidate for an experiment and 
a federal moratorium. It presents both the need for regulatory learning 
and an entrenchment risk. But because the EPA lacks information that 
would be relevant for a rulemaking, the federal government has 
conducted only a study reliant on voluntary cooperation and has 
allowed interest groups to become entrenched. 
A key factual question regulators need to answer is whether 
fracking contaminates groundwater. If the risk is established, 
regulators then need to answer whether regulations can mitigate the 
risk. To the extent that information about this risk exists, the firms 
conducting the fracking likely possess it. They have little incentive to 
be fully forthcoming with this information because it could lead to 
increased public opposition, tighter regulation, or tort suits. It is 
conceivable that residents who live adjacent to fracking operations have 
some evidence of the risk to groundwater, but this evidence will be 
scattered and anecdotal. 
To imagine how an experiment and a moratorium for fracking 
might have worked best, one would need to travel back to the early 
2000’s, not long after it first became clear that horizontal drilling and 
the new, slickwater fracking technique applied to shales were 
economically viable.211 At that point, there would have been a plausible 
case that fracking created a significant risk to health and the 
environment, but not enough information to start a conventional 
rulemaking or conduct a meaningful cost-benefit analysis. This would 
have been the prime moment for intervention. 
 
 207.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 571 (West 2015). 
 208.  NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL 
GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS, AND SOLUTION MINING 
REGULATORY PROGRAM (2015), http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/ 
findingstatehvhf62015.pdf, [http://perma.cc/3ZWH-6UFN]. 
 209.  Spence, supra note 204, at 455. 
 210.  See, e.g., 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.30 (2015) (assigning regulation to the Railroad 
Commission, which is the main oil and gas regulator in the state). 
 211.  See Merrill & Schizer, supra note 156, at 154 (“In 2000, shale supplied negligible 
amounts of oil and only 2% of domestically produced natural gas in the U.S.”). 
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A randomized experiment, coupled with a moratorium on 
fracking outside of the experimental conditions, could have been 
possible. The EPA could have set up a lottery, and firms interested in 
conducting fracking operations could have entered each site at which 
they proposed to drill. The firms also could have suggested possible risk-
mitigating measures to test. The EPA would have then used the lottery 
to randomly assign each site into multiple groups: a control group, an 
unrestricted group, and possibly other groups designed to test 
promising risk-mitigating measures. Sites assigned to the control group 
could not commence operations, but would nonetheless be monitored to 
establish baseline conditions. Sites in the unrestricted group could 
begin fracking. Sites in the risk-mitigation groups would begin fracking 
within the risk-mitigation conditions. 
One advantage of a randomized experiment is that the evidence 
that it would produce would not be susceptible to the type of site-specific 
criticisms that can cloud the results of localized groundwater 
contamination studies. For example, one fracking proponent has argued 
that “it can be difficult to determine the cause of particular incidents of 
alleged groundwater contamination . . . [because] (1) often there are 
multiple potential causes of contamination and (2) a lack of baseline 
water quality data may make it difficult to know when the 
contamination first appeared.”212 On this reasoning, industry groups 
have requested baseline testing at fracking sites.213 It is easy to see why 
industry would want the tests: they could yield possible explanations 
for subsequent evidence of contamination other than fracking 
operations. The benefit of a large, randomized experiment is that, if the 
groundwater near the sites at which fracking is allowed (the treatment 
group) is observed to be contaminated at a significantly higher rate 
than it is at sites at which it is prohibited (the control group), there 
would be strong evidence that other theories of contamination do not 
explain the results. 
The main challenge in organizing an experiment like this would 
be getting a large sample: firms would need to submit enough sites into 
the lottery for the groups to be large enough to measure effects.214 But 
firms’ incentives would be well aligned with the agency’s on this issue 
because the more sites the firms entered, the greater the chance that 
 
 212.  Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing and the Baseline Testing of Groundwater, 48 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 857, 868 (2014).  
 213.  Id. at 873. 
 214.  See Abramowicz et al., supra note 9, at 974 (“There is no magic number for all 
experiments; a small number of observations may be enough if the measured effect of the 
intervention is anticipated to be large, but a large number may be needed for small anticipated 
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the firms would actually get to start operations. Another potential 
worry is that the lottery will give some lucky firms a sufficiently large 
competitive advantage that the firm may come to dominate the market. 
If some firms are able to grow quickly, they could increase the risk of 
entrenchment. But a large-n sample should make any one firm’s 
dominance unlikely. 
The EPA would also need to carefully monitor that firms 
complied with the risk-mitigating measures to police crossover215 and 
that they did not conduct fracking outside of the experimental 
conditions to police spillover.216 If the experiment worked, the agency 
should acquire good evidence on whether groundwater contamination 
is likely and whether it can be mitigated. The agency also might monitor 
ambient environmental conditions in the areas surrounding the sites 
and pick up on any changes, which could provide evidence of 
unanticipated risks.217 The EPA could then proceed to rulemaking with 
less risk of regulatory error. 
It is difficult to imagine a similar regulatory experiment today. 
The practical obstacles to shutting down some percentage of the 
numerous fracking operations underway might make it infeasible. But 
the main reason such an experiment would not be viable is interest 
group entrenchment. 
The recent fracking boom had its origins in “a number of 
independent gas producers,” who “started fiddling around with the idea 
that you could combine horizontal drilling with hydraulic fracturing.”218 
The “breakthrough” came in 1998, when “an independent gas producer 
named George Mitchell, working in the Barnett Shale field near Fort 
Worth, Texas, figured out the right combination of horizontal drilling, 
pressure, and proppants to get the gas flowing out of shale.”219 The best 
window for aggressively regulating fracking was then—when its only 
proponents were independent gas producers like Mitchell. 
But Mitchell’s “success was observed by other producers, and 
they quickly emulated his methods.”220 The structure of the industry 
has changed radically. Today, “[l]arge production companies are 
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gradually replacing the small and independent firms that pioneered 
this practice.”221 Fracking interests have increasing influence in state 
legislatures and Washington. According to a report by Common Cause, 
an activist group that tracks money in politics, oil and gas firms 
involved in fracking spent $110.2 million on lobbying in 2010, up from 
$29.1 million in 2001.222 
Perhaps more importantly, local economies have come to rely on 
fracking. In the Bakken Shale in North Dakota and Montana, the 
Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania and surrounding parts of Appalachia, 
and multiple shale plays in Texas and elsewhere, fracking has brought 
employment, tax revenue, and new infrastructure—along with health, 
safety, and environmental risks.223 It is the perfect storm of interest 
group entrenchment: a wealthy but concentrated and organized 
industry that has created economic dependence in certain state and 
local economies. 
There also may be a type of social norm entrenchment taking 
place as well. Cultural cognition may be influencing perceptions about 
the risks fracking creates. Support for and opposition to fracking 
correlates strongly with self-identifying as conservative or liberal 
respectively.224 Critically, individuals who report greater familiarity 
with fracking are significantly more likely to express strong support or 
strong opposition to the practice.225 It is possible that, since fracking 
resembles a lot of other industrial processes that create environmental 
risks, these cultural cognition effects were inevitable, but it is difficult 
to know how public opinion might have developed during a regulatory 
experiment. If these cultural divisions calcify, public opinion might not 
 
 221.  Merrill & Schizer, supra note 156, at 249. 
 222.  James Browning & Melanie McElroy, Deep Drilling, Deep Pockets In Congress & 
Michigan, COMMON CAUSE 4 (2011), http://www.commoncause.org/research-reports/National 
_111011_Report_Michigan_Deep_Drilling_Deep_Pockets.pdf [http://perma.cc/TP6T-9SLA]. 
 223.  Media coverage has been extensive. For one account of the Bakken Shale, see Chip 
Brown, North Dakota Went Boom, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 31, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/02/03/magazine/north-dakota-went-boom.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/LF4N-J5TX]; for an 
account on the Marcellus Shale, see Eliza Griswold, The Fracturing of Pennsylvania, N.Y. TIMES 
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AMERICANS’ VIEWS ON NATURAL GAS DRILLING USING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 13 (2012), 
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be receptive to new evidence about whether fracking risks justify 
regulation. 
There may still be a window for regulatory action, however. If 
the groundwater contamination risks prove to be substantial, and they 
can be vividly demonstrated, public opinion might turn against 
fracking, even in areas where it has come to dominate the local 
economy. The risks might also turn out to be insignificant or susceptible 
to mitigation with inexpensive measures. The fracking boom could end 
just as rapidly as it began, if some future emerging technology 
undercuts its economic rationale. But if the risks do turn out to justify 
regulation, the window for regulatory action may have elapsed, in part 
due to the structure of administrative law. 
B. E-Cigarettes 
E-cigarettes are battery-controlled devices that vaporize a liquid 
solution containing nicotine to produce a sensation that mimics tobacco 
smoking. According to the industry, e-cigarettes provide “enjoyment 
without the stigma.”226 But according to the activist group Americans 
for Nonsmokers’ Rights, the message the public should be sent is that 
“Electronic Cigarettes are NOT a safe alternative!”227 In a proposed rule 
published in April 2014, the FDA stated flatly: “We do not currently 
have sufficient data about these products to determine what effects e-
cigarettes have on the public health.”228 
What we do know is that use of e-cigarettes is rising rapidly. As 
of 2013, the most recent year for which data from a peer-reviewed study 
is available, 8.5% of surveyed US adults reported having used e-
cigarettes at least once, increasing from 3.3% in 2010.229 According to 
the CDC’s National Health Interview Survey, which in 2014 included 
questions about e-cigarette use for the first time, 12.6% of surveyed US 
adults reported ever having tried an e-cigarette.230 According to the 
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CDC’s National Youth Tobacco Survey, as of 2014, 13.4% of high school 
students surveyed reported using e-cigarettes in the past 30 days, up 
from 1.5% in 2011.231 Even 3.9% of middle school students surveyed 
reported e-cigarette usage in the past 30 days,232 up from 0.6% in 
2011.233 
1. Risks and Benefits 
Tobacco smoking causes more than 480,000 deaths in the United 
States each year, which makes it the nation’s leading cause of 
preventable deaths.234 As of 2014, 16.8% of the adult population 
smoked.235 The persistence of tobacco smoking in spite of widespread 
awareness of its lethality motivates both the case for and against e-
cigarettes. 
Proponents generally make two arguments. First, “switching to 
vaping e-cigarettes instead of smoking combustible cigarettes means 
users can avoid the myriad of toxins and other carcinogens created by 
tobacco combustion.”236 Second, “[e]-cigarettes have the potential to be 
more effective at moving smokers away from traditional cigarettes than 
traditional nicotine reduction devices.”237 Proponents point to the 
United Kingdom’s Royal College of Physicians, which in June 2014 
reiterated its position that, based on the available evidence, “e-
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cigarettes could lead to significant falls in the prevalence of smoking in 
the UK.”238 
Opponents argue that e-cigarettes will “induce nicotine 
addiction” in non-smokers and “possibly serv[e] as a gateway product 
for subsequent cigarette use.”239 In particular, they contend that 
consumers might be misled because e-cigarette firms have (at least 
until recently, as we will see below) made unsupported claims about e-
cigarettes’ safety or effectiveness at helping smokers smoke less.240 
Opponents have also claimed that industry has deliberately targeted 
youth by marketing e-cigarettes with chocolate, vanilla, and fruit 
flavorings,241 which are banned in conventional cigarettes.242 There are 
potential secondary risks as well. The FDA has claimed that trace 
amounts of toxic chemicals have been found in e-cigarette cartridges.243 
The CDC has reported that there has been a rise in calls to poison 
control centers about e-cigarette poisoning, 51.1% of which involved 
children under age five,244 raising fears that e-cigarettes create a risk of 
acute toxicity. 
Because e-cigarettes have been in wide use for only a few years, 
there is little empirical research that might help assess the competing 
claims about the causal relationship between e-cigarette use and 
tobacco smoking. When the FDA published its proposed rule on e-
cigarettes, the agency stated that “[a]lthough e-cigarettes may have 
short-term smoking reduction benefits, FDA cautions that long-term 
studies are not available to conclude that e-cigarettes are a proven 
cessation product.”245 The FDA also stated that it could not “establish 
what effects e-cigarettes have in users who might have otherwise quit, 
but instead engage in dual use of e-cigarettes and another tobacco 
product.”246 
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The FDA’s summary of the evidence reveals that almost no 
randomized studies have been published. One exception is a high-
profile randomized control study from New Zealand published in The 
Lancet in 2013.247 In the study, 657 adult smokers who wanted to quit 
were randomly assigned to e-cigarette, nicotine patch, or placebo e-
cigarette groups, and the experimenters sought to measure what 
percentage of each group was abstinent from smoking six months 
later.248 While abstinence was slightly higher in the e-cigarette group, 
at 7.3%, than in the patches group, at 5.8%, or the placebo group, 4.1%, 
those numbers were much lower than anticipated. As a result, the 
experimenters conceded they “had insufficient statistical power to 
conclude superiority of nicotine e-cigarettes to patches or to placebo e-
cigarettes.”249 The New Zealand study does not provide strong evidence 
for either side of the e-cigarette debate, but it does demonstrate both 
the theoretical possibility—and some of the practical difficulties—of 
conducting randomized studies on the effects of e-cigarettes. 
2. Existing Regulation 
Federal statutes treat drugs and tobacco products differently, so 
the set of regulatory options for controlling e-cigarettes depends on its 
categorization. The FDA has broad authority under the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)250 to regulate drugs to ensure that they are “safe 
and effective.”251 The FDCA generally requires that any new drug 
receive the FDA’s premarket approval and also empowers the agency to 
withdraw approval if it learns that the drug is unsafe or ineffective.252 
In 1996, the FDA asserted that nicotine was a “drug” within the 
meaning of the FDCA and promulgated a series of regulations intended 
to reduce tobacco use among minors.253 In 2000, in FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Co., the Supreme Court held, “based on the FDCA’s 
overall regulatory scheme and . . . subsequent tobacco legislation, that 
Congress has directly spoken to the question at issue and precluded the 
FDA from regulating tobacco products.”254 
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Nine years later, Congress responded to Brown & Williamson by 
enacting the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 
2009 (“TCA”),255 which amended the FDCA to authorize the FDA to 
regulate tobacco.256 The TCA explicitly required that the FDA 
reintroduce the rules it promulgated in 1996 that the Court struck down 
in Brown & Williamson.257 
The TCA includes two new provisions that are potentially 
relevant for e-cigarettes. One provision requires premarket review for 
any “new tobacco product,” which is defined as a tobacco product “that 
was not commercially marketed in the United States as of February 15, 
2007.”258 Another provision requires that any “modified risk tobacco 
product,”—which is defined as “any tobacco product that is sold or 
distributed for use to reduce harm or the risk of tobacco-related disease 
associated with commercially marketed tobacco products”—will only be 
approved for market when the agency issues an order permitting it.259 
An order will be issued only if the agency determines that the new 
product would “significantly reduce harm and the risk of tobacco-
related disease to individual tobacco users,” and “benefit the health of 
the population as a whole taking into account both users of tobacco 
products and persons who do not currently use tobacco products.”260 
The FDA’s initial attempt to regulate e-cigarettes did not use 
these new authorities under the TCA. Instead, in 2009, the FDA 
ordered that a shipment of e-cigarettes from the firm Sottera, which 
markets its e-cigarettes under the label NJOY, be denied entry into the 
United States on the legal theory that the e-cigarettes were unapproved 
drug-device combinations under the FDCA.261 Sottera sued, and, in 
Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, the D.C. Circuit rejected the FDA’s theory on the 
ground that Sottera had not made any therapeutic claims in advertising 
the products.262 The FDA decided not to appeal and stated in a letter 
that it would instead regulate e-cigarettes under the TCA.263 
In April 2014, the FDA published a proposed rule, which would 
deem e-cigarettes to be a “tobacco product” so it could regulate them 
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under the TCA.264 The proposed rule states that e-cigarettes likely 
“would be considered new tobacco products and would be required to 
obtain an order from FDA prior to marketing.”265 It also anticipates that 
firms would no longer make any claims that e-cigarettes are “light,” 
“low,” or “mild” in light of the modified risk provision.266 
In the absence of federal regulation, state laws and local 
ordinances have been enacted. According to a list maintained by 
Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights, eight states have explicitly 
prohibited e-cigarettes in all workplaces, restaurants, and bars.267 
Utah, for example, includes e-cigarettes in its ban on smoking in public 
places other than retail shops that sell e-cigarettes.268 Sixteen other 
states have at least some regulation of e-cigarettes.269 Presently, 475 
municipalities have banned e-cigarettes in at least one of workplaces, 
restaurants, or bars.270 
3. Prescriptions 
The New Zealand study demonstrates that the effects of e-
cigarettes on smoking are amenable to testing. To avoid ethical issues, 
regulators could study pre-existing smokers, both those who, like the 
participants in the New Zealand study, want to quit,271 and also those 
who intend to keep smoking. The experiment should include a control 
group that has no access to e-cigarettes, a treatment group that does 
have access, and a placebo group. It would be helpful to measure both 
the effect on quit rates and on the frequency with which participants 
smoked conventional cigarettes. 
This type of experiment would have several challenges. Because 
smoking is a stigmatized behavior, individual self-reports are not 
 
 264.  See Proposed E-Cigarette Rule, supra note 228, at 23,143 (clarifying that the FDA has 
the authority to issue regulations to bring other tobacco products not explicitly mentioned in the 
statute under the law so long as those products meet the statutory definition of tobacco product, 
and e-cigarettes meet that definition). 
 265.  Id. at 23,174. 
 266.  See id. at 23,149 (including one of the health benefits of this rule as the “[e]limination of 
‘light,’ ‘low,’ and ‘mild’ descriptors and other unproven modified risk claims”). 
 267.  States and Municipalities with Laws Regulating Use of Electronic Cigarettes, AM. 
NONSMOKERS’ RIGHTS FOUND. 1, http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/ecigslaws.pdf (last updated Jan. 1, 
2016) [http://perma.cc/3H4D-H82A] [hereinafter U.S. State and Local Laws]. 
 268.  See UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-38-2.6 (West 2012) (listing exceptions to the general ban on 
use of e-cigarettes in places of public access). 
 269.  See U.S. State and Local Laws, supra note 267, at 1–3 (listing different states’ 
approaches to e-cigarette regulation). 
 270.  See id. at 3–8 (listing different localities’ approaches to e-cigarette regulation). 
 271.  See Bullen et al., supra note 247, at 1630 (stating that participants had said they “wanted 
to quit smoking”). 
        
2016] REGULATION OF EMERGING RISKS 461 
always reliable. Because it is a repetitive behavior, memories may not 
be reliable even if reports are sincere. There is a strong possibility of 
attrition. In the New Zealand study, the researchers observed a strong 
dropout rate among the group that was randomly assigned nicotine 
patches; the study speculated that some of these group members, who 
joined the study in the hope of access to free e-cigarettes, grew 
uninterested after they learned they had been assigned not to receive 
them.272 Consistent with that theory, in the absence of a tight 
moratorium, there may be crossover risk from control group members 
who use e-cigarettes outside of the experimental conditions. 
There are also practical and ethical limitations to what could be 
learned from experiments. It would be useful to learn if non-smokers, 
some of whom were randomly assigned to receive free e-cigarettes, were 
more likely to start smoking conventional cigarettes. But it would be 
impossible to justify the health harm to participants, even if they gave 
informed consent. Randomized experiments with e-cigarettes obviously 
cannot include minors, but how tightly e-cigarettes should be controlled 
may ultimately hinge on how minors are affected. There also would not 
be sufficient time in the experiment to observe the long-term health 
effects of e-cigarette use itself, which could be just as important as e-
cigarettes’ causal effects on conventional smoking. 
Even with these challenges and limitations, the case for 
randomized experiments with e-cigarettes is strong. If e-cigarettes 
really do help smokers quit, they should probably be commercially 
available, and should definitely be available by prescription to current 
smokers. If e-cigarettes lead to greater smoking, there is a plausible 
argument for banning them outright, if the black market can be 
effectively suppressed, or at least imposing more coercive restrictions. 
The open question is whether regulations more restrictive than 
the FDA’s proposed rule remains politically feasible. The political 
economy of e-cigarette regulation has rapidly changed in the past few 
years, leading to interest group entrenchment. An article published in 
2013 stated that “[t]he industry [wa]s dominated by small, independent 
companies, with the exception of blu eCigs, which was acquired in April 
2012 by Lorillard Tobacco Company for $135 million.”273 Now, the other 
major tobacco firms have followed Lorillard. In 2014, Altria acquired e-
cigarette maker Green Smoke.274 Reynolds American, which was 
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created by a merger of R.J. Reynolds and Brown & Williamson, planned 
to introduce its own line of e-cigarettes, called Vuse.275 Interestingly, 
later in 2014, Lorillard acquired Reynolds American, and in a sign of 
how important the e-cigarettes market is expected to become, agreed to 
sell blu to another major tobacco firm, Imperial Tobacco, to improve the 
chances of the merger surviving antitrust review.276 In 2015, Japan 
Tobacco acquired the e-cigarette company Logic Technology 
Development.277 
For a brief period, it was conceivable that the major tobacco 
firms would view e-cigarettes as a threat, creating the possibility of a 
Baptist-and-Bootlegger coalition between public health advocates and 
tobacco firms for tighter e-cigarette regulation.278 But now that the 
major tobacco firms have consolidated their position in the e-cigarette 
market, one of the most powerful industries in Washington can oppose 
tighter regulation of e-cigarettes. 
Social norm entrenchment is happening as well. Some public 
health scholars contend that tobacco use has declined in part because it 
has been successfully stigmatized. For example, a recent article in the 
New England Journal of Medicine explained that “[a]s information 
about the hazards of sidestream smoke was publicized in the 1980s and 
1990s, the imperative to protect ‘innocent bystanders’ moved to the 
center of tobacco-control efforts, and public smoking bans pushed 
smokers into the shadows. The once-widespread habit . . . became 
highly stigmatized.”279 Now, “[m]arketing campaigns for e-cigarettes 
threaten to reverse the successful, decades-long public health campaign 
to denormalize smoking.”280 The renormalization may already be 
 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  See Mike Esterl & Peter Evans, Reynolds American to Buy Lorillard for $25 Billion, 
WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2014 8:01 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/reynolds-american-to-buy-
lorillard-for-27-4-billion-1405422823 [http://perma.cc/SJS9-667H]. 
 277.  Tripp Mickle, Japan Tobacco to Acquire U.S. Electronic Cigarette Company Logic 
Technology Development, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30, 2015, 11:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
japan-tobacco-to-acquire-u-s-electronic-cigarette-company-logic-technology-development-
1430423065 [http://perma.cc/Y84C-BP7T]. 
 278.  For the origin of this metaphor, see Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists—The 
Education of a Regulatory Economist, REGULATION: AM. ENTERPRISE INST. J. ON GOV’T & SOC’Y, 
May–June 1983, at 12, 13–14. 
 279.  Amy L. Fairchild et al., The Renormalization of Smoking? E-Cigarettes and the Tobacco 
“Endgame,” 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293, 293 (2014). 
 280.  Id. To be clear, Fairchild and her colleagues are open to the possibility that e-cigarettes 
can be a net positive for public health; in fact, they contend that “an unwillingness to consider e-
cigarette use until all risks or uncertainties are eliminated is dangerously close to dogmatism.” Id. 
at 295. But they note that “strict denormalization strategies may be incompatible with e-cigarette 
use.” Id. 
        
2016] REGULATION OF EMERGING RISKS 463 
underway––in 2013, the New York Times declared in a headline: 
“Smoking Is Back, Without the Stigma.”281 
The status of the stigma is important for public health outcomes 
because it might affect how many non-smokers start using e-cigarettes, 
and possibly start smoking conventional cigarettes. But what makes it 
relevant for entrenchment is that the electorate might be more 
reluctant to support restrictive regulation on e-cigarettes if they do not 
perceive e-cigarette use as stigmatized. The normative case for 
imposing a moratorium solely to halt social norm entrenchment is 
always uneasy. One person’s social norm entrenchment can be 
another’s democratic deliberation. Yet there are three plausible 
justifications in the case of e-cigarettes. 
First, if firms are misleading consumers about the health effects 
of e-cigarettes, that might justify discounting the value of decisions 
based on that misleading information. After the Sottera decision, some 
e-cigarette firms have been attempting to avoid making therapeutic 
claims. For example, on its website, the Smoke-Free Alternatives Trade 
Association, an e-cigarette trade association, claims: “While electronic 
cigarettes are not smoking cessation tools nor are they marketed that 
way, there may be anecdotal evidence that some people have reduced 
or eliminated use of traditional cigarettes.”282 But there is evidence 
that, in the words of one comment that the FDA received on the 
proposed rule from public health scholars, “e-cigarette companies have 
explicitly and implicitly made therapeutic claims about their products 
in their online marketing and promotional materials” in the past.283 So 
even if firms are no longer making these claims, the lingering effects of 
earlier therapeutic claims in advertising may be contributing to the de-
stigmatization. But, of course, this issue is impossible to resolve now 
because the evidence on the therapeutic claims is mixed. 
Second, cognitive dissonance might delay future acceptance of 
evidence demonstrating worse than anticipated health risks from e-
cigarettes. There is evidence that smokers’ beliefs exhibit the effects of 
cognitive dissonance, but that these beliefs fade when smokers quit.284 
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The combination of potentially misleading advertising early on, lax 
regulation, and widespread use leading to de-stigmatization, could 
bolster the effect of cognitive dissonance. 
Third, there is a related possibility that cultural cognition could 
influence assessment of future health and safety evidence about e-
cigarettes, as it influenced the reception of evidence about the health 
risks of conventional cigarettes. A former Surgeon General stated that 
“‘the diffusion of new knowledge . . . was impeded by the entrenched 
norm of smoking, a widespread practice fueled by the persistent and 
pervasive marketing of cigarettes.’”285 The public “did ultimately come 
to believe the empirical information . . . only after a shift in social 
meaning . . . made acceptance of that information compatible with a 
diverse array of cultural outlooks.”286 To the extent that similar 
perceptions develop for e-cigarettes, cultural cognition, rather than 
pure normative disagreement, might motivate opposition to regulation. 
C. Autonomous Vehicles 
As of December 2015, Google reports that its autonomous cars 
had travelled over 1.3 million miles autonomously on public 
roadways.287 In 2014, Rio Tinto claimed that fully autonomous trucks 
had logged 2.3 million kilometers at its mines in Australia.288 In 2012, 
Volvo demonstrated the feasibility of linking cars in a computer-
controlled “road train” so that they drive along a highway in tandem.289 
Daimler has demonstrated that its autonomous Mercedes can navigate 
traffic on the autobahn.290 In 2016, the Department of Transportation 
announced a ten-year, $4 billion proposal to fund pilot programs for 
autonomous vehicles, an acknowledgement that “partially and fully 
automated vehicles are nearing the point at which widespread 
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deployment is feasible.”291 The prospects of autonomous vehicles are no 
longer science fiction and deserve serious scholarly and regulatory 
attention. 
The history of the current generation of research into 
autonomous vehicles started with a government agency. In 2004, the 
US military’s in-house think tank, the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (“DARPA”), organized a competition, the DARPA 
Grand Challenge, in which teams were to race autonomous vehicles 
over a 142-mile route across the Mojave Desert to win a $1 million 
prize.292 In the first DARPA Grand Challenge, no vehicle travelled more 
than 7.5 miles, but by 2005 teams were successfully completing similar 
courses, and by 2007 they were completing courses with traffic and 
obstacles.293 In the past several years, development has shifted to the 
private sector. Google’s project may be the most advanced and high 
profile, but many of the major automakers now claim to be researching 
semi- or fully autonomous vehicles. 
1. Risks and Benefits 
To understand the risks and benefits of autonomous vehicles, it 
is important to distinguish among different degrees of automation. The 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) divides 
autonomous vehicles into four levels, the most important and advanced 
of which are Levels 3 and 4.294 Level 3 is “Limited Self-Driving 
Automation,” which “enable[s] the driver to cede full control of all 
safety-critical functions under certain traffic or environmental 
conditions” and “rel[ies] heavily on the vehicle to monitor for changes 
in those conditions requiring transition back to driver control.”295 Level 
4 is “Full Self-Driving Automation.”296 
Lower level technologies can bring significant safety benefits, 
and NHTSA is starting to require some of them in new models.297 But 
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the effects of Level 4 autonomous vehicles could transform society. 
Much of the discussion of the costs and benefits of autonomous vehicles 
has, therefore, focused on a world in which Level 4 technologies are 
widely available. The most recent estimates suggest that an estimated 
32,675 Americans died in auto collisions in 2014.298 Many of those 
crashes are due to driver error. In 2008, NHTSA issued a report to 
Congress on the causes of motor vehicle collisions.299 The report itself 
does not explicitly state what percentage of total collisions are 
attributable to driver error, but the data the report presents has been 
used to calculate the widely repeated claim that driver error accounts 
for approximately 93% of collisions.300 For that reason alone, the 
benefits of autonomous vehicles—at least with Level 4 technology—
could be staggering. 
There are other significant benefits other than the body count. 
Reducing collisions would save resources spent on auto repair, policing, 
and adjudication, and because collisions would be less frequent, cars 
might be designed lighter, reducing manufacturing costs and saving 
fuel.301 Level 4 autonomous vehicles could also advance civil rights by 
providing mobility to the elderly and the disabled.302 A change in 
patterns of car ownership would trigger many of these economic 
benefits.303 We take it for granted now that, outside of a few very dense 
cities, individuals who can afford to do so will own cars and drive them 
when needed, but otherwise leave them parked for most of the day.304 
With fully autonomous vehicles, individuals might be able to sign up for 
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a service that sends whatever car is available to them on demand. Think 
of today’s ridesharing services like Uber and Lyft, but without human 
drivers. In this way, individuals may no longer be responsible for 
purchasing and maintaining privately owned cars, and cars would no 
longer sit idle in driveways or parking garages. They might be used 
much more efficiently, reducing congestion and the total number of 
vehicles on the road, diminishing the need for highways as the distance 
between cars necessary for safety (and thus the total space needed for 
the same volume of cars) decreases, and freeing up valuable land 
currently devoted to parking.305 
Level 4 autonomous vehicles would bring risks as well. Because 
they will make riding by car less expensive, they might have the effect 
of increasing the amount of total miles traveled.306 That could raise fuel 
consumption, although that effect might be counterbalanced by 
ridesharing services owning more electric vehicles, with a smaller set 
of gasoline-powered vehicles reserved for infrequent, long trips outside 
of an electric vehicle’s range. The reduced cost of travel might also 
change land use patterns by encouraging suburban sprawl.307 
Some scholars have worried that the ease of tracking 
autonomous vehicles might reduce privacy.308 Others speculate that 
autonomous vehicles will be hacked by criminals or terrorists.309 But 
the most significant negative effect is orthogonal to risk regulation: the 
potential for massive, sudden unemployment, concentrated among 
unskilled workers and workers with non-transferable skills.310 A world 
without a need for taxi, bus, and truck drivers, and less of a need for 
workers in the auto manufacturing, auto parts, auto repair, and auto 
insurance industries might be a world with an unemployment problem 
that might compare to the unemployment effects of de-
industrialization. 
The pervasive uncertainty surrounding how society will adjust 
to fully autonomous vehicles makes speculative any suggestions about 
what regulatory regime should govern their use in the long term. But 
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despite the significant risks and costs, it is difficult to dispute that, if 
autonomous vehicles can prevent most of the tens of thousands of 
deaths and hundreds of thousands of injuries vehicle collisions cause, 
they should be encouraged. The best policy for smoothing the transition 
to autonomous vehicles might require regulation. 
2. Existing Regulation 
The 1966 National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act grants 
NHTSA broad authority to “prescribe motor vehicle safety 
standards.”311 In a law review article published in 2012, four NHTSA-
affiliated lawyers outlined how NHTSA might implement that 
authority, stating that the agency could “establish safety standards 
applicable to vehicles that are originally manufactured with 
autonomous capabilities and to aftermarket equipment that could be 
added to vehicles . . . to convert them into autonomous vehicles.”312 
So far, however, NHTSA’s role in autonomous vehicle policy has 
been limited to research and voluntary guidelines.313 In 2013, NHTSA 
issued a preliminary statement of policy, which stated that the agency 
“believe[s] that states are well suited to address issues such as 
licensing, driver training, and conditions for operation related to 
specific types of vehicles.”314 The statement explains that, “[w]hile 
NHTSA’s authority, expertise, and mandate is to establish uniform, 
national standards needed for vehicle safety, the agency recognizes that 
premature regulation can run the risk of putting the brakes on the 
evolution toward increasingly better vehicle safety technologies.”315 But 
NHTSA nonetheless recommended guidelines for state regulation, 
discouraging states from permitting autonomous vehicles on the road 
for purposes other than testing, and suggesting how testing might be 
regulated for safety.316 
In 2016, however, NHTSA released an update to their 
preliminary statement of policy. Recognizing that “partially and fully 
automated vehicles are nearing the point at which widespread 
deployment is feasible,” the statement commits NHTSA to releasing 
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best-practice guidance for the safe operation of Level 4 autonomous 
vehicles within six months.317 
Five states have enacted statutes to govern autonomous 
vehicles318—California,319 Florida,320 Nevada,321 Michigan,322 and 
Tennessee.323 So has the District of Columbia.324 California325 and 
Nevada326 have promulgated regulations to implement the new 
statutes. California has set up a permitting system to control testing of 
autonomous vehicles.327 Nevada has provided for a special license.328 
Both states rely on the continuing presence of human operators. 
California requires that a human driver be “seated in the vehicle’s 
driver seat and either: monitoring its operations and able to take over 
physical control of the vehicle; or, in physical control of the vehicle.”329 
Nevada requires that at least two humans ride in any autonomous 
vehicle on public roadways, “one of whom is the operator and must at 
all times be seated in a position which allows the person to take 
complete control of the vehicle, including, without limitation, control of 
the steering, throttle and brakes.”330 So even if firms are testing Level 
4 technology, California and Nevada expect that a human driver will 
act as if the vehicle had only Level 3 technology. 
In the absence of federal legislation or regulation, the legal 
status of autonomous vehicles in other states is not obvious. In 2014, 
one scholar undertook a survey of every state’s vehicle code331 and 
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concluded that “[c]urrent law probably does not prohibit automated 
vehicles.”332 
3. Prescriptions 
Autonomous vehicles differ from fracking and e-cigarettes in 
that there is no isolatable factual question that regulators need to 
answer quickly. A randomized experiment may not be necessary. 
Instead, regulators need to monitor the development of autonomous 
vehicles to ensure that the state will pick up on any of the speculative 
risks like hacking or, more importantly, any risks that are unforeseen, 
so that rapid intervention is possible. 
But there is a strong case for controlling the testing of 
autonomous vehicles on reverse entrenchment grounds. One potential 
obstacle to public acceptance is that early, high profile collisions will 
turn public sentiment against the new technology and lead to 
legislation that impedes its development. One leading automotive 
technology researcher has stated that “[i]t is unclear how courts, 
regulators, and the public will react to accidents involving robotic cars. 
Overreaction is a clear danger, even if could it be shown that a 
transition to autonomous vehicles leads to far fewer traffic-related 
deaths over all.”333  This type of worry is familiar from the history of 
emerging technologies.  As one historian puts it, “we have seen 
examples in which a single incident gone awry undermined years of 
careful planning and building of regulatory systems.”334 
With autonomous vehicles, one potential risk is that firms will 
market cars with level 3 technologies, which will have the perverse 
effect of increasing collisions. This theory of risk is based on the premise 
that, once human drivers come to rely on partial automation, their 
driving skills may atrophy, or they may just become dangerously 
inattentive, so that they will not be prepared to take over in the event 
of an emergency. For this reason, both NHTSA and private firms have 
emphasized the importance of human-machine interface research.335 
These concerns resemble familiar worries in aviation safety. For 
example, France’s civil aviation safety investigation authority 
determined that analogous human-machine interaction problems 
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contributed to the crash of Air France Flight 447 over the Atlantic 
Ocean in 2009.336 
Federal regulation could significantly reduce the risk of reverse 
entrenchment by controlling experimentation and ensuring that all 
firms take sufficient care to avoid collisions that could impede public 
acceptance. Note that, even if the median firm takes due care, the whole 
industry could be set back by a collision caused by just one negligent 
outlier firm. 
The best regulatory strategy to ease the transition to 
autonomous vehicles may be to prohibit firms from testing vehicles with 
Level 3 technologies on public roads. The political complication with 
this strategy is that it appears that Google and the major automakers 
have diverged on whether Level 3 technologies should be used. Until 
May 2014, Google had been testing autonomous vehicles with Level 3 
technologies. As The New York Times reported, “[t]here were no 
crashes. But Google engineers realized that asking a human 
passenger—who could be reading or daydreaming or even sleeping—to 
take over in an emergency won’t work.”337 The Google researchers “‘saw 
stuff that made [them] a little nervous.’”338 So Google is now testing 
fully autonomous, Level 4 vehicles limited to 25 miles per hour.339 
But most of the major automakers, perhaps because their brands 
are bound up with the appeal of the driving experience or perhaps 
because they anticipate that fully autonomous vehicles will bring the 
end of individual car ownership, “favor an incremental approach to self-
driving cars, in which features such as lane centering and parking 
assistance are gradually integrated into vehicles.”340 
So the automakers may resist mandating Level 4 technologies. 
But the interests of Google and any other firm that takes its Level-4-or-
bust approach may be roughly aligned with the interests of federal 
regulators over the medium term. These firms might actually support 
federal regulation if it would reduce the risk of reverse entrenchment 
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or at least give them a competitive advantage over the automakers. So 
far, however, NHTSA has not shown interest in this type of approach. 
In its initial policy statement, NHTSA “strongly recommend[ed] that 
states require that a properly licensed driver be seated in the driver’s 
seat and ready to take control of the vehicle while the vehicle is 
operating in self-driving mode on public roads.”341 
Which side has more influence is unclear. By market 
capitalization and lobbying expenditures,342 Google is far more powerful 
than a typical innovator start-up, but its potential adversaries—the 
major automakers—are some of the most powerful firms in the nation. 
So the political opportunity autonomous vehicles presents is not as 
straightforward as it would be for the typical emerging risk. But the 
benefits of controlled testing—and a moratorium to protect against 
collisions outside of the tests—might justify regulatory intervention. 
V. SECOND BEST STRATEGIES UNDER EXISTING LAW 
The robust Experimentalist model of regulation this Article 
defends would require a statute. Given how infrequently Congress has 
enacted new statutes in recent years, one should be skeptical about any 
proposal that requires statutory reform. This Part considers how 
agencies might be able to implement experiments and moratoria under 
existing law. It is important to note at the outset that there is no general 
statutory barrier to conducting regulatory experiments. Agencies have 
issued rules that function as experiments under existing statutes,343 
and the absence of more experimental rules need not be explained by a 
lack of statutory authority. It may be that regulated firms do not want 
to bet on rules that might generate evidence of their own disutility.344 
Even randomized experiments are possible under existing law. 
Hard look review should not pose a problem because “an agency should 
be able to justify employing a randomized experiment on the ground 
that this approach could provide information relevant to the 
administrative process.”345 But this is only true if an agency goes 
through the “ordinary notice-and-comment process”346—the process 
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that, along with cost-benefit analysis and judicial review, stymies early 
attempts to regulate emerging risks. This Article has argued that 
agencies need to be able to start experiments on emerging risks before 
they have sufficient information to survive a conventional rulemaking, 
and they need to be able to use experimental results to generate rules 
before entrenchment has precluded regulatory options. 
This Part analyzes two strategies to permit agencies to conduct 
experiments and impose moratoria on emerging risks without going 
through the conventional rulemaking process. First, agencies could 
bypass notice-and-comment rulemaking by adopting interim final rules. 
Second, they could expedite the rulemaking process by working towards 
a negotiated regulation with interested parties. 
Each of these approaches is a second best strategy. The legal 
provisions on which they rely were not designed for the purpose of 
allowing a flexible response to emerging risks. For many emerging 
risks, these strategies would not be legal or practical. But in some cases, 
they might provide agencies useful workarounds to the brittle 
rulemaking process that might otherwise impede sensible regulation. 
A. Interim Final Rules 
Interim final rules “are rules adopted by federal agencies that 
become effective without prior notice and public comment and that 
invite post-effective public comment.”347 Agencies possess the power to 
promulgate interim final rules because of a statutory exception in the 
APA, which provides that an agency need not follow notice and 
comment procedures “when the agency for good cause finds . . . that 
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or 
contrary to the public interest.”348 
The process of using an interim final rule works as follows. First, 
an agency makes a legal determination that it has good cause to deviate 
from conventional notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.349 The 
agency can then promulgate its interim final rule immediately. Next, 
an agency decides to accept comments on the rule after it has gone into 
effect.350 Agencies are not legally obligated to solicit post-effective 
comments, but it is a sound strategy because “[t]he fact that the agency 
solicited and considered the post-effective comments in good faith might 
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persuade a court that the agency’s initial good cause claim was 
justified.”351 After an agency receives the post-effective comments on 
the interim rule, it can, following conventional rulemaking procedures, 
proceed to adopt a final rule.352 
Interim final rules are not unheard of in practice. In fact, 
empirical evidence suggests that “interim final rulemaking ha[s] been 
increasing over time.”353 Agencies are also more likely to use interim 
final rules when the stakes are high.354 According to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), between 2003 and 2010, agencies used 
interim final rules for 15% of major rules355—a category that includes 
all rules that are likely to result in effects of $100 million or more per 
year.356 By contrast, agencies only used interim final rules for 4% of 
nonmajor rules.357 
The appeal of interim final rules for regulating emerging risks 
is considerable. When an agency confronts an emerging risk, it could 
use an interim final rule to impose a moratorium or other limits on the 
risky technology. It could then organize experiments with the risky 
technology without allowing entrenchment to occur. When the 
experiments were completed, the agency could use the conventional 
rulemaking process to arrive at a final rule, making sure to consider 
post-effective comments from outside parties to increase its chances of 
surviving judicial review. 
The main obstacle to agencies using interim final rules to 
regulate emerging risks is satisfying the good cause exception. 
Unfortunately, “[n]umerous judicial decisions, well supported by the 
legislative history, establish that the APA’s good cause provision is 
narrowly construed.”358 Although an interim final rule is more likely to 
be upheld if the agency makes it effective only for a temporary period,359 
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the D.C. Circuit has held that “the limited nature of the rule cannot in 
itself justify a failure to follow notice and comment procedures.”360 
For emerging risks, whether the good cause exception applies 
would depend on the facts of the particular case. This whole area of 
doctrine is “exceedingly factbound.”361 In general, the courts have 
demanded that agencies seeking to invoke the exception demonstrate 
exigent circumstances.362 It is possible that “[a] public health or safety 
emergency or an environmental crisis . . . potentially qualifies.”363 But 
the cases in which such an emergency has been held to justify the good 
cause exception—a spate of helicopter accidents, a threat of extinction 
during an ongoing hunting season, and the allocation of landing slots at 
Reagan National Airport—reflect a genuine urgency that the 
development of a new risky technology may not create.364 The most 
high-profile recent case about the good cause exception, Jifry v. FAA,365 
involved the Federal Aviation Administration’s decision to forgo notice-
and-comment rulemaking for a rule allowing the agency to revoke the 
pilot certificates of non-resident aliens automatically upon receiving 
notification that the pilot posed a security risk366—a risk arguably more 
urgent than the risks addressed here. 
One further complication is that, for many emerging risks, the 
need for quick restrictions is not potential harm from the technology 
itself, but the threat of entrenchment foreclosing regulatory options. It 
is difficult to imagine an agency arguing for a good cause exception to 
the notice and comment provisions on the ground that the agency’s 
regulatory options might elapse because of changes in interest group 
power or social norms, at least given the strong judicial practice of 
institutional formalism.367 
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But when an emerging risk itself poses a risk of urgent harm to 
health, safety, or the environment and the moratorium would prevent 
that harm, it might be possible for agencies to prevail under the good 
cause exception. It is conceivable that such a rationale could have 
persuaded a court at the moment a new risky product like e-cigarettes 
was introduced. If fracking had had the attention of regulators before it 
became commercially viable, there too it is conceivable that an agency 
could have persuasively cited a potential risk to health or the 
environment. But both of these examples would more likely have come 
out the other way. The doctrine is too factbound to generate strong 
predictions, and agencies have not even attempted to use interim final 
rules to regulate emerging risks. 
If an agency could prevail under the good cause exception, 
however, an interim final rule would improve on the conventional 
rulemaking process. If one agency successfully adopted an interim final 
rule to temporarily limit a new risky technology, it might establish a 
beachhead precedent for the regulation of emerging risks. 
B. Negotiated Regulation 
Negotiated regulation allows agencies to expedite rulemaking by 
dealing directly with the parties it was designed to benefit. It is “a 
consensus-based process, usually convened by an agency, through 
which stakeholders negotiate the substance of a rule.”368 Although 
agencies have engaged in negotiated rulemakings since at least the 
early 1980s,369 the current practice was codified in 1990 through the 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act (NRA).370 
The basic procedure is as follows. First, the agency “determine[s] 
that a negotiated rule making is in the public interest and [announces] 
the formation of a negotiating committee in the Federal Register so that 
members of the public may apply to participate.”371 Once convened, the 
“negotiating committee seeks to produce a consensus rule that will 
either be proposed intact by the agency in [a notice of proposed 
rulemaking] or form the basis of the proposed rule.”372 
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Rules promulgated through negotiated regulation “are still 
subject to notice and comment” even if the parties in the committee 
arrive at a consensus.373 In addition, NRA provides that “[a] rule which 
is the product of negotiated rulemaking and is subject to judicial review 
shall not be accorded any greater deference by a court than a rule which 
is the product of other rulemaking procedures.”374 
Proponents of negotiated rulemaking argue that the process 
“improves rule quality, reduces transaction costs and increases 
legitimacy.”375 Opponents charge that it concentrates too much power 
in private parties and allows them to steer regulation away from the 
public interest.376 They emphasize empirical evidence that negotiated 
rulemaking does not save time377 and does not reduce litigation.378 
These debates, however, are fought at the level of the practice of 
negotiated regulation as a whole. The empirical results that raise doubt 
about the efficiency gains of negotiated regulation reflect aggregate 
numbers. For any particular regulatory problem, negotiated 
rulemaking may still be sound policy. 
One advantage of negotiated regulation that is relevant for 
emerging risks is its potential for agencies and interested parties to 
learn more from each other than they would under conventional 
rulemaking procedures. Participants in negotiated regulations 
frequently report that they learned from the process, particularly about 
the scientific and technical aspects of a proposed rule.379 
The regulation of autonomous vehicles is a prime candidate for 
negotiated rulemaking. NHTSA, by its own statements and actions, is 
not prepared or sufficiently informed to enter the conventional notice-
and-comment rulemaking process. But, as Part IV argued, there is a 
strong case for early regulation to forestall reverse social norm 
entrenchment. Fortuitously, the set of firms developing autonomous 
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vehicles is small, and they are all sophisticated repeat players in the 
regulatory process. There is also a broad consensus about the ultimate 
goal of regulation: to smooth the transition to a world with dramatically 
fewer traffic fatalities. 
The challenge, of course, is that at the present moment, Google 
and the automakers differ on how that transition should best be 
achieved. But it is possible that, with NHTSA convening, a negotiated 
rulemaking might lead the parties to converge on a consensus set of 
rules for regulating autonomous vehicles. Short of granting NHTSA the 
powers defended here, negotiated regulation may be the most promising 
option. 
Other emerging risks might resemble autonomous vehicles in 
their suitability for negotiated regulation, especially if the parties to the 
rulemaking could be expected to arrive at a consensus. Nanotechnology 
might be one such risk. But, for most emerging risks, the politics of 
regulation are too contentious for negotiated rulemaking to provide a 
solution. For regulating those risks, agencies need the experiment and 
moratorium powers they currently lack. 
CONCLUSION 
For most of modern history, medicine was a net negative for 
human health. If one contracted an illness during the era of 
bloodletting, the wisest response may have been to avoid medical care 
altogether. Science knew so little about disease and how to treat it that 
existing treatments did more harm than good. But in the twenty-first 
century, although evidence-based medicine is still a work in progress 
and some ineffective and many not-cost-justified practices persist, basic 
medical science has advanced far enough that one should not think 
twice about seeking medical treatment. 
There may be a similar story to tell about regulation. Scientific 
understanding of health and environmental risks has developed 
dramatically over the past several decades, so regulators are more 
likely to know what evidence is reliable, what theories are plausible, 
and what further tests ought to be done. It may be that, in a world in 
which the risk of regulatory error was high, waiting to let risks develop 
before acting—or cutting them off permanently at the start—was good 
policy. But now that we know more about how to regulate, maybe we 
should be more willing to experiment with regulation on the next risk. 
